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ABSTRACT 
 Analysis of public institutions must be robust to the uncertainties facing agents 
within them, and the varying ways in which individuals cope with these uncertainties. 
This dissertation uses formal theoretical models to analyze the subjective and 
idiosyncratic nature with which most citizens face risk and uncertainty. This dissertation 
focuses on how different public institutions perform in specific settings based on the 
possibilities that agents may err in either their assessment of possible outcomes or the 
relevant choices and payoffs that are available.  
In the first chapter, I show that allowing for voter beliefs to feature ex-post error 
changes the incentives for candidates to set policy platforms, reducing the incentives for 
candidate convergence even with purely electorally-motivated candidates. Therefore, 
even if voters are on-average correct about political platforms and behavior, the 
distribution of imprecision will still change the incentives of political actors competing 
for their votes. This reopens consideration of how American political polarization may be 
driven by changes in the ways in which voters form beliefs about politicians, even as the 




In the second chapter, co-authored with Keith N. Hylton, we determine that the 
incentives for potential litigants depend fundamentally upon the specific setting in which 
courts make determinations. We show that courts, facing only the facts concerning this 
particular decision, and not all the facts necessary to determine the global optimum, will 
be more likely to create incentives for socially excessive (i.e., defensive) care. 
In the final chapter, I modify a model of strategic communication to consider 
situations under which groups may be able to manipulate legislators who are uncertain 
which topics are most salient to said groups. Such uncertainty changes the incentives of 
interest groups, providing a new avenue of exploration for why different ideological 
groups take on different issues. I find that they must weigh the ability to “hide” their 
salient issue within a bundle of others with the possibility that taking on too many will 
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1 The Imperfect Beliefs Voting Model
1.1 Introduction
It has long been understood by social scientists that voters do not have full information
concerning the policy platforms of parties. Voters are unable to recall the most basic
of political facts (Cambell et al. (1960); Kinder and Sears (1985); Carpini and Keeter
(1996)), misunderstand statements made by politicians (Mason (2015)), make voting
decisions based upon irrelevant information (Leigh (2009); Wolfers (2009); Healy,
Malhotra and Mo (2010); Huber, Hill and Lenz (2012); Achen and Bartels (2013)),
and base their beliefs on a slew of private conversations and biased opinions (Levy
and Razin (2015); Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015)). What's worse, they often have
little incentive to improve the knowledge that they do possess, i.e. they are rationally
ignorant. As noted by Lupia and McCubbins (1998), Ironically, for many political
issues, information is not scarce; rather it is the cognitive resources that a person
can use to process information that are scarce. Despite this, our major models of
partisan competition assume perfect observability.
In this paper, I show that simply allowing voters to have imperfect beliefs over
exactly what platforms candidates will implement leads to substantively different
policy outcomes than the aforementioned models. This leads to a model with purely
election-motivated candidates better matching the empirical evidence. It does this
while maintaining the tractability of the Downsian framework, allowing for positive
policy analysis.
How do imperfect beliefs form? There has long been evidence within the social
scientific literature, yet under-explored in political economy, that different socioeco-
nomic and cultural groups have difficulty communicating with each other (e.g. Hymes
(1964); Lang (1986); Lazear (1999)). This problem will be amplified by the exten-
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sion to politics, where voters have little incentive to bridge the gap in understanding
between themselves and the candidates or the candidates' supporters. Indeed, recent
work in political science has established that we can think of politics in terms of a
process through which conventions become intelligible to participants through observ-
able usages and effects (Wedeen (2002)) and that recent social polarization coarsens
this common process (Mason (2015)). Therefore, voters will have more precise beliefs
over the platforms presented by parties that speak their language, while only form-
ing ad hoc beliefs over those from different backgrounds. If parties know this, they
will set their policies accordingly, effectively committing to their own cultural base
rather than the general population.
I propose a new voting model, the imperfect beliefs voting model, to represent
this interaction of beliefs, culture, and communication. In a fashion similar to the
probabilistic voting framework popularized by Enelow and Hinich (1982), Ledyard
(1984), and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), my model creates continuity by adding
a stochastic element. Unlike probabilistic voting, however, the beliefs, rather than
preferences, of voters are stochastic; the more culturally distant a voter is from a
party, the greater the potential ex-post error in beliefs. Therefore, the results depend
on how cultural distance interacts with personal policy preferences. A preview of the
results follow.
If policy preferences are uncorrelated with cultural distance, and hence precision
of beliefs, we may retrieve the classic Median Voter Theorem. Even here, however, the
Median Voter Theorem may fall apart if one politician is viewed with more precision
by a larger portion of the population and there is some skew in voters' preference
distribution (for example, due to the log-normal distribution of income). In this
case, the party which is viewed with less precision will have an incentive to appeal
to outliers in the distribution who are less likely to flip their preferences due to small
2
amounts of noise. In this way, non-incumbent, outsider parties will appeal to more
extreme elements of the population.
Moreover, evidence seems to indicate that parties are simultaneously becoming
more polarized both along cultural and socioeconomic grounds, as well as in policy
(e.g. Brewer and Stonecash (2007)). For example, the Pew Research Center has shown
that white, working class voters, a historically split demographic, have strongly and
rapidly sorted into the Republican Party over the past decade, with nearly 60% now
identifying as strong Republicans (Pew (2012)). The imperfect beliefs voting model
demonstrates why we should expect such polarization to be correlated. When policy
preferences are correlated with belief precision, there will be divergence away from
the median voter as both parties gain marginally more from appealing to the people
with whom they can communicate more easily. Therefore, as the population becomes
polarized on cultural grounds, they will become polarized on political grounds as well.
Just as Downs used the intuition of Hotelling in a political framework, the imper-
fect beliefs voting model takes comparative advantage to show that parties which are
differentiated in their ability to communicate to different sets of voters will specialize
in their policy appeals. This realization leads to substantially different equilibrium
predictions and comparative statics. The remainder of the paper shows how one can
use the model to undertake such policy analysis.
The model provides an explanation for the party polarization in the United States
that has occurred over the last half-century. While there is little evidence that the
nation at large is becoming more polarized on political values, politicians currently
are at their most polarized when it comes to voting behavior (e.g. Ozdemir and Ozkes
(2014)). Figure 1, recreated from McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), maps the
difference between the average DW Nominate scores, a measure of partisan voting
behavior, for party politicians in the U.S. House and Senate (Carroll et al. (2013)).
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Figure 1:
A sizable literature has emerged, reviewed by Fiorina, Abrams and Pope (2005) and
McCarty et al. (2006), questioning several potential explanations, such as a polarizing
electorate, changes in electoral institutions, gerrymandering, and the rise of primary
systems within the parties. At the least, it appears that there is still a substantial
residual even controlling for these instutitonal changes. The model provides endoge-
nous results consistent with the time-series evidence, showing that politicians have
polarized as voters have begun sorting based on socioeconomic characteristics and as
inequality has grown.1 It implies that cultural segregation and sorting, such as the
selective move into the suburbs and assortative mating, has impacted positive policy
outcomes.
In particular, one difference between the imperfect beliefs voting model and Down-
1Since the data on polarization and housing segregation referenced within this paper rely on
time series at a national level, an interesting test of the imperfect beliefs voting model that has
been suggested would be to see if the cross-sectional and panel evidence on housing segregation
and political divergence between parties also matches the predictions of the model. I am currently
working on acquiring the appropriate data for such a task.
4
sian/probabilistic voting models comes via the role of identity. Probabilistic voting
models predict that voters whose sociocultural identity is tied to a party or candidate
will actually be relatively ignored in terms of policy outcomes. For example, this
leads to the oft-repeated prediction that African American priorities are ignored by
both parties as they vote overwhelmingly for the Democrats. However, this prediction
relies on the assumption that such a preference is based on valence and not tied to
the policies supported by the candidates. If, instead, the role of identity is to increase
the perceptiveness of the voter with respect to a particular candidate, we should ex-
pect that they will be better represented by that candidate and less represented by
the opposition. So, instead of being equally ignored by both parties, the model pre-
dicts that African Americans should be best represented by those candidates (usually
Democrats) who are culturally tied into their community, while being less represented
by Republicans. In equilibrium, this will still lead to the overwhelming vote shares,
but does not require an exogenous assumption of valence.
Finally, I apply the model to the classic Meltzer and Richard (1981) model of
political redistribution. The implications of the model in this context are two-fold.
First, we should be focusing on the interaction between the rich and the poor and the
ability of the two groups to communicate ideas of redistribution to each other; it is
this sociological relationship which will have a greater impact than inequality itself.
Second, if the two parties tend to be divided by income, as is seen in most nations, the
two parties will diverge to their own bases, leading one to offer inefficiently high levels
of government spending, and the other to potentially offer inefficiently low spending.
The model predicts that divergence will increase between a small government and a
big government party, with an ex ante ambiguous impact on the ex-post fiscal policy
implemented.
In section 2 of the paper, I review the relevant literature. In section 3, I outline
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the key parameters of interest within the imperfect beliefs voting model. In section
4, I analyze the equilibria of the game. In particular I divide into two cases: where
policy preferences are independent of belief precision, and when they correlate in some
observable way. In sections 5 and 6, I apply the model to consider the implications
of imperfect beliefs for political polarization and the role of inequality and the level
of redistribution. Finally in section 7, I discuss the assumptions and structure of the
model. I conclude by briefly contrasting the results of the imperfect beliefs voting
model and other major models with respect to the empirical evidence.
1.2 Literature
The increase in political polarization within the United States over the past half-
century remains something of a mystery. Voting models of non-ideological, strategic
candidates, following Downs (1957), tend to predict convergence, while divergence
required ideological candidates with some form of commitment problem.2 For exam-
ple, Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005) showed that policy divergence could be
acquired if candidates targeted their messages to different social groups, encouraging
them to turnout. Similarly, Feddersen and Gul (2014) and Krasa and Polborn (2014)
recently have shown that polarization can be driven by rising inequality, but they
relied on both ideological candidates and a need for donations to garner this result.
However, the imperfect beliefs voting model shows that it is also possible to derive
divergence and potentially explain polarization by focusing on voter uncertainty over
policy, a phenomenon that has been observed throughout the political sphere.
Previous literature on uncertainty has focused on imperfect observation of can-
didate quality, defined as ability to deliver public services efficiently, rather than
uncertainty over the state of the platform itself (e.g. Coate (2004); Carrillo and Cas-
2For an overview of the results with perfect observability, see Persson and Tabellini (2002).
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tanheira (2008); Frenkel (2014)). For example, Carrillo and Castanheira 2008 find
that, with asymmetric information over candidate investment in quality, candidates
may have an incentive to diverge from the median voter in order to signal their qual-
ity. In contrast, the model shows that divergence can be driven without a separate
voter preference for candidate quality, i.e. only ideological voters.
There are a number of major papers that deserve attention for doing work on
platform uncertainty, e.g. Berger, Munger and Potthoff (2000); Alesina and Holden
(2008); Virag (2008); Gul and Pesendorfer (2009); Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin
(2012); Agranov (2012); Ashworth and de Mesquita (2014). Most of this work has
focused on cases with candidate bias, while Virag (2008) and Agranov (2012) are sim-
ilar to the model in that they feature purely Downsian candidates, though the former
can only achieve a special case of culturally differentiated preferences and the latter
requires the context of a primary campaign. The model generalizes these results by
obtaining divergence and realistic dynamics even with purely Downsian candidates
within a general election. This allows the model to feature testable implications con-
cerning the dynamics of polarization and divergence discussed above without making
assumptions about exogenous changes to candidate preferences or electoral law.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Parties
Following standard convention, I model an election consisting of two parties, 1 and
2, competing for the votes of a set of citizens of measure one. The parties only care
about the rents that can be obtained from holding office, i.e. they have no personal
policy beliefs.3 Once elected, a victorious party implements the policy platform to
3One can alternatively think of strategic parties choosing politicians (who do possess personal
policy preferences) in order to maximize electoral success.
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which he committed himself during the campaign. For simplicity, let us consider
policies P ∈ R. This standard framework allows for increased tractability and the
model's predictions to be compared directly to the classical Hotelling-Downs setup,
as well as both probabilistic voting and citizen-candidate models.
I assume that the parties will pick their policy platform P k to maximize their
expected vote share, pi for party 1; 1 − pi for party 2. This assumption has been
defended extensively elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2002)).4
I allow for full commitment on the part of candidates, such that candidates will
make their intentions known in the form of public platforms.5 These platforms will be
chosen simultaneously by the two candidates, but will not be observed with precision
by the voters.
1.3.2 Voters
Every voter possesses an ideal policy point, xi, such that they prefer a policy closer to




k) = U(|Pˆ ik − xi|)
4While it may be of interest to consider maximizing the probability of winning instead a la
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), this exercise proves to be mathematically intractable due to the
structure of the model, while not appearing to provide any additional illumination of candidate
behavior since the asymmetry in candidate incentives holds in either case. For example, consider
the probability of winning as an increasing function Ψ(pi), where pi is the expected vote share. In
this case, the relevant first order condition for candidate 1 is ∂Ψ∂pi
∂pi(P1,P2)
∂P1
; therefore, the equilibrium
condition of ∂pi(P1,P2)∂P1 = 0 remains the same.
5While it is certainly true that commitment problems and candidate policy biases exist, their role
in generating divergent behavior has been explored elsewhere in the literature; I seek to identify a
new cause of divergence which has not otherwise been identified: voter beliefs and cultural distance.
Indeed, adding limited commitment to the model will simply add to the incentives for divergence




is voter i's subjective belief about the policy platform of party k and the
utility function is single-peaked and symmetric about the ideal point. These voters
will vote sincerely based upon their beliefs.
The driving assumption of the imperfect beliefs voting model is that these beliefs
must only be consistent with a subjective belief Pˆk
i
, and that this belief depends in
some way upon the true policy platform Pk. This provides the model with flexibility,
allowing the economist to match voter behavior to the data.
Let δik ∈ {0, δ} be a measure of sociocultural distance between the party and voter
i, where δ > 0, such that the variance of Pˆ ik is increasing in δ
i
k.
For tractability, we separate the continuum of voters into groups based upon their
sociocultural distance from the candidates:
Definition 1: Voter i is within the cultural base of party k if δi = 0.
Assumption 1: Each voter is within the cultural base of exactly one party, with
µ of the population within the base of party 1.
Through various social networks and individualistic information sources, voters
will always have a relatively better idea of the platform for one party compared to the
other. This focuses emphasis on the role of intelligibility and social sorting in politics
(e.g. Wedeen (2002); Mason (2015)). Therefore, a portion µ of the population is
within the base of party 1, will have more precise beliefs over that candidate, and will
correctly assess their utility from supporting that candidate, with the rest within the
base of party 2, featuring the potential for imperfect signals. The starkness of this
assumption allows for tractability in analysis of the model, but is not substantive,
as adding voters within the base of both parties limits to the standard Downsian
model. Therefore, as shown in Online Appendix B, the key assumption is simply the
asymmetry such that some voters have a smaller propensity to have ex-post errors
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about a particular candidate.
Since the base represents those with whom a party can better relate their platform,
the social network and communication asymmetries that divide the voting population
into bases may also divide the population by policy preferences. Therefore, the policy
preferences xi for any voter i in the base of party 1 will be distributed according to
continuous CDF G(·) ∼ [a, b] and the preferences for those in the base of party 2 will
be distributed according to H(·) ∼ [c, d]. Larger differences between elements of G
and H represent greater correlation between the social-cultural and policy differences
within the population.
1.3.3 Equilibrium
I will analyze subgame perfect equilibria of the game between the parties described
above. Specifically, I define the game and equilibrium of interest as follows:
Definition 2: An Imperfect Beliefs Voting Game, Π, consists of the tuple
{F,G,H,µ, δ,{Pˆ i1,Pˆ i2}i}.
Definition 3: A political equilibrium for Π consists of a pair of policy plat-
forms (P1,P2) such that:
1. P1 ∈ argmax pi
2. P2 ∈ argmax (1-pi)









and votes for each with probability 1
2
otherwise.
4. If voter i is within the base of party 1, Pˆ i1 = P1.
Note that for the voters, we relax the standard Nash assumption that there must
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be consistency between a player's beliefs and the outcome; here, we simply require
that this relationship exist for those politicians in whose base a given voter resides.6
1.3.4 Additively Symmetric Beliefs
For the remainder of the paper, however, I will limit the analysis to a special form of
beliefs such that voter beliefs will be correct in expectation:
Definition 4: Beliefs are additively symmetric if and only if Pˆk
i
= Pk + δ
i
ki.
where i is an i.i.d. random variable representing errors in voter belief formation.
i will be drawn from a distribution with symmetric CDF F with mean 0, standard
deviation σ2, and full support. In addition, let f be the well-behaved pdf of F , which
is strictly decreasing in |x|, with lim|x|→∞f(x) = 0; hence, larger errors are less likely
than smaller errors. Here, the key is that the precision of voter beliefs with respect to
party platforms is diminishing in their cultural distance from a party and the bulk of
the population has reasonable, albeit potentially wrong, beliefs about the platforms,
though radically wrong beliefs are still permitted. This symmetry is consistent with
Bartels (1996)'s notable results that voter mistakes tend to symmetrically wash out
ex post.
To see how such a reduced form may be generated, note that these beliefs are iso-
morphic to scenarios with overconfident voters (e.g. Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015)).
Suppose that voters begin with some common prior pi and receive noisy signals
Pˆk
i
= Pk + δ
i
ki. Now suppose that they are overconfident and believe that δ
i
k = 0
6Note that if voters were fully rational in a Nash sense (e.g. with common knowledge of the
game being played between candidates and voters), a voter in the base of party 1 would treat any
communication from party 2 as cheap talk (as in Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shapiro (2005)). Therefore,
the incentive discussed in Proposition 1 would be enhanced as parties would have no incentive to
appeal to voters who did not have precise beliefs over their platform. The equilibrium of such a
game would trivially be for each party to diverge to the median ideal point of their base. While this
does not appear to describe actual voter behavior, it does help highlight the incentive structures
that exist with Culturally Differentiated preferences.
11
∀k; in other words, they are overconfident in their ability to interpret their platform.
This would generate exactly the ex-post beliefs above, as voters believe they have
received a precise signal when, in fact, they are receiving a noisier signal about one
candidate.
This differentiates the model from standard models of imperfect information. In
those models, voters cannot perfectly observe the policies chosen by parties, or poten-
tially the relevant information necessary to know what policy the parties will choose,
and must update over prior information and any signals which the parties may send
and the voter may receive. By contrast, voters in the model are presented with the
platforms directly, but may simply make errors in their interpretation of the informa-
tion. Therefore, P k would be the correct posterior given the signal, but the voter
makes errors in updating which leads to the mistaken posterior of Pˆk
i
. In this way,
their beliefs are imperfect.
Therefore, given platform positions P1 and P2, the parties will know that the
expected vote share of party 1, pi, is




2x− P1 − P2
δ























2x− P1 − P2
δ
)− F (P2 − P1
δ
)]dH(x)]
1.4 Political Equilibria Analysis
Within the classical probabilistic voting framework, both parties feature identical
incentives. This symmetry in marginal voters is what leads to the convergence results
which underlie positive policy analysis within such models. The probabilistic element
enters as a linear shift in voter preferences, maintaining marginal utilities over policy
platforms. Therefore, swing voters are equally appealing to both parties.
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In contrast, with imperfect beliefs the voters do not change the marginal likelihood
of their vote by the same amount. In this case, the probabilistic element is within the
utility function rather than an external shift to preferences. This is what differentiates
the imperfect beliefs voting model from a probabilistic voting model in which the
parties simply have asymmetric beliefs over each group's swingability.
Equation 1 for any voter i can be rewritten in terms of the error  :
Property 1:















if xi > P1
2. Voter i not within the base of 1 will vote for 1 iff

i ∈ [ 2xi−P1−P2δ , P2−P1δ ] if xi < P2
i ∈ [P2−P1δ ,
2xi−P1−P2
δ
] if xi > P2
Property 1 highlights the crucial incentives created by imperfect voter beliefs. In
order to consider the swingability of each voter, it is useful to think in terms of their
voting responsiveness with respect to voting for each candidate:
Definition 5: Voter i's responsiveness with respect to P k is the marginal




Proposition 1: Consider two voters, i and j, who differ only in that voter i is
within the base of party 1 and j is within the base of party 2. The following is true:
1. The responsiveness of voter i is greater than the responsiveness of voter j with
respect to P 1, and vice-versa for P 2.
2. If P1 > (<)xi and P2 > (<)xi, then the differences in responsiveness are dimin-
ishing in |P2 − x|.
As in standard Downsian models, it remains true that a party can increase its




voters possess imperfect beliefs, however, Proposition 1 tells us that there is now an
asymmetry in the relative gains to be had to parties from given voters. To see the
intuition, consider the extreme case in which a voter in the base of party 1 will have
a fixed distribution of beliefs over party 2 independent of P2, and vice-versa for those
within the base of party 2. In this case, voters in one party's base will only be affected
by the policy of that party, and will be perfectly inelastic with respect to the other
party's choice of platform.
For an example, consider figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2, the voter represented by
ideal point xi is within the base of party 1. Suppose we start at a position where both
parties represent the same platform, shown here at P 1 = P2. In this case, the ex-ante
distribution of voter i's beliefs with respect to candidate 2's platform are represented
by Pˆ2(P2). Therefore, they will vote for party 2 if and only if their beliefs fall in the




1. A move in her direction will decrease the chance she votes for party 2
(shrinking the area to B) by increasing the possibility that she thinks party 2 is too
extreme relative to party 1. This is done along two dimensions: it both decreases
the probability that she thinks that party 2 is to the left of party 1 (removing area
C), while also increasing the probability, conditional on thinking that party 2 is to
the left, that she thinks that party 2 is too far to her left (area A). As evidenced in
figure 2, the latter possibility is less likely, but not impossible (A < C).
By contrast, if the voter is in the base of party 2, the distribution of errors for i
at the point of convergence such that he would vote for 1 is the complement of that
when he's in 1's base (B+C+D in figure 3). Therefore, the effect of party 1 moving
in her direction is not so simple as it changes in platform shifts the distribution, not
the boundaries. It is still true that the platform change will decrease the probability
that party 1 will be viewed as to the right of party 2 (removing area D); however,
it will also increase the probability that party 1 will be viewed as too far to the left
(area A will now result in a vote for 2). Therefore, the voter is less responsive to
party 1's platform change then she would have been if she had perfect beliefs as she
may overreact to a shift to the left by thinking that party 1 is becoming too radical
relative to her (perfect) belief of party 2.
From here forward, I will take one functional form assumption in order to allow
us to talk about a left party and a right party:`
Assumption 2: G and H are weakly single-peaked, with Gmed ≤ Hmed.
Definition 6: Parties are said to be Culturally Differentiated if G strictly
first-order stochastically dominated by H.
Definition 7: Parties are said to be Culturally Independent if G = H every-
where.
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Another way to think of Culturally Differentiated preferences is that cultural distance
δi is correlated with policy ideal points xi. In these cases, we can differentiate ideal
policies by group. Hence, Culturally Independent preferences are those where xi is
independent of δi. These two cases allow us to explore the most common ways in
which communication and culture interact with policy preferences.
1.4.1 Culturally Differentiated Preferences
In much of the world, particularly developing nations, parties are divided along
strongly ethnic lines, with the bases of each party supporting a different set of public
goods and policy positions. Even in the developed world, parties are increasingly
looking very different from each other in terms of demographic attributes such as in-
come, marriage rates, ethnic background, etc. Evidence has increasingly shown that
such differences have an impact on the policies implemented (e.g. Levitt (1996)).
Therefore, in a world of increasing socio-cultural polarization, it makes sense to begin
by allowing for correlation between policy preferences and sociocultural distance.7
As discussed above, the two parties may have a comparative advantage in certain
classes of voters depending on the distribution of beliefs and preferences. This leads
to the following major result:
Theorem 1: If there are Culturally Differentiated preferences with µ = 1
2
and
G(xmed - ) = 1 - H(xmed + ) for any  ≥ 0, then there exists a unique equilibrium
such that both parties place between the median voter and the median voter of their
own base, with the same distance from the median voter. Both candidates win the
7Consider, for example, the case of those who support a stronger social safety net and consider
it an issue of liberty and rights, but have difficulty expressing that to those who view such
concepts through a predominately negative lens. In such a world, politicians will have to take into
consideration how they can best word their platform to appeal to everyone, while simultaneously
being aware that their base are the ones that will be most responsive to the positions that they take.
This is because their base speaks their language.
16
same share of the vote.
The level of divergence, |P1−P2|, is greater given greater cultural distance between
groups, δ.
By Theorem 1, the Median Voter Theorem is generally violated. Even with
a single-peaked, symmetric distribution of voter preferences and two parties with
identically-sized bases, the inability to perfectly communicate with members of the
opposing party's base causes a form of policy risk aversion on the part of candidates
as described in Proposition 1. Therefore, each party will tend more towards those who
can observe them perfectly, knowing that in expectation they are more likely to get
it right and recognize that the party matches their preferences. If either party was
to try to move towards the median of the general population, they risk losing more
voters from their own base who hold incorrect ex-post beliefs over the other party
than they are likely to gain by trying to capture the other party's voters. In general,
the parties will locate at just the right position such that they will, in expectation,
capture the voters within their own base while still remaining in play for moderates
of the other side.
To elucidate why convergence cannot be an equilibrium with asymmetric bases,
consider Proposition 1. Suppose the two parties were to converge to the platform
of the median voter. With perfect beliefs, this would be optimal for both sides
as they would simultaneously lose as many voters as they gain by changing their
platform. However, with imperfect beliefs, there is an asymmetry in the way that
such probabilistic gains and losses would occur. Suppose party 1 was to move to the
left. They would lose support in expectation from the members of party 2's base.
However, this loss is only of a second order, as the range of errors such that a base
voter of party 2 will vote for candidate 1 remains the same; the loss in expectation
17
only comes from the fact that large errors are less likely than small errors. In fact,
for moderate members of 2's base, the party actually reduces the probability of said
voters thinking they are too extreme.
By contrast, for much of party 1's base (those that will remain to the left of his
new policy profile), the errors will not only now need to be smaller, and therefore more
likely, but the range of sufficient errors such that 1 wins is now larger in absolute terms.
Therefore, while these ideologically committed voters still know that the party is too
moderate, there will now be a larger range over which they believe that the other
party is either even more moderate or too extreme. In equilibrium, by Proposition
1.2, the two parties will diverge enough that the probabilities of such ex-post errors
are so low that the candidate will have nothing to gain from further pandering to his
base.
Note that in equilibrium it is unlikely that the voter will ever believe that party
1 is to the right of party 2. Therefore, part of the equilibrium dynamics which occur
will limit the real impact of the voters' imperfect beliefs. While, in reality, few believe
that the Republican party is to the left of the Democratic party, this is an equilibrium
outcome.8 If the two parties were actually to converge to a symmetric policy, there
would be nothing unreasonable about believing any directional relationship between
the two.
1.4.2 Culturally Independent Preferences
Culturally Independent preferences are a useful limiting case which can be used to
examine situations in which the correlation between voter ideal points and political
belief formation are weak.
8Though, as ANES data reveal, there do still exist some individuals who do perceive such a
relationship between the two parties.
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With the assumption of Culturally Independent preferences, we may reacquire
the Median Voter Theorem:
Theorem 2: Let µ ≥ 1
2
and G = H be weakly positively skewed. If there are
Culturally Independent preferences, there exists a unique equilibrium such that P 1 ≤
xmed ≤ P2 and |P1 − xmed| ≤ |P2 − xmed|. All are equalities if and only if G is
symmetric or µ = 1
2
.
Note that the conditions of the theorem are without loss of generality. Even with
Culturally Independent preferences, the Median Voter Theorem is only a special case
with imperfect beliefs. Convergence is an equilibrium if and only if both parties are
viewed with precision by equal portions of the population or if the distribution of voter
preferences is symmetric. Otherwise, a candidate who is viewed with greater precision
will have the advantage in winning more mainstream voters, while those with weaker
voter perceptions will specialize in appealing to outliers. This can generate policy
divergence even without differentiated party bases.
Why does the Median Voter Theorem not hold without the above conditions?
Suppose the two parties place their platform at the median voter's ideal point. By
Proposition 1, voters will make their decision more on the basis of party 1's policy
choice than party 2's. However, this asymmetry is minimal for those outlier voters to
the extreme right, as they are unlikely to ever think any candidate is too extreme. In
this case, the party who is viewed with precision by a smaller portion of the population
could move away from the mass of the distribution (i.e. towards the skew) since they
gain relatively more from the outliers whom are less likely to make ex-post errors.
Inversely, the candidate who is viewed with greater precision will have an incentive to
move towards the mass of the distribution as trying to appeal to voters in the skew
would be too costly as they viewed with such precision.
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One implication of this result is that it provides an electorally-oriented explanation
for the move by incumbents towards the majoritarian position (i.e. the mass of
the distribution), while challengers find themselves appealing to outliers. Presidents
Reagan, Clinton, Bush, and Obama were all perceived as running more moderate
campaigns on their re-election tries than when they initially entered the White House
as representatives of the outsider party (American National Election Studies (2014)).
If we consider that an incumbent is more likely to actually implement the policies
proposed prior to an election, and will receive more broad and free coverage from the
media, it is reasonable to believe that such a candidate will be perceived with less
error. Therefore, as a candidate, the incumbent will have more to lose from appealing
to extremists relative to the masses. By contrast, any challenger to an incumbent will
find it harder to challenge the incumbent directly with said masses, but will instead
find the need to appeal directly to those who are highly unlikely to be pleased with
the majoritarian policies of an incumbent, i.e. the outliers. This incentive structure
is similar to models of valence which gives one candidate a discrete advantage (e.g.
Groseclose (2001)) or exogenous reputation (e.g. Bernhardt and Ingerman (1985)),
but does not rely on the presumption that voters have an inherent preference for the
incumbent; instead, this equilibrium advantage is derived endogenously.9
1.5 Cultural Beliefs, Imperfect Beliefs, and Polarization
As shown above, political polarization does not necessarily matter by itself, since
politicians will still converge to the median as long as the precision of beliefs is not
tied into their preferences or distributed asymmetrically. Candidates only become
9In addition, such a model requires additional assumptions to generate the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium. Indeed, on equilibrium path, Groseclose (2001) does not generate this incentive
structure. By contrast, Theorem 2 shows us that the model maintains this structure with only limited
assumptions.
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more radical when sociocultural distance increases and voters become more likely to
have imperfect beliefs concerning certain candidates. This provides a new avenue for
empirical exploration, as social sorting may be driving recent ideological divergence
within the parties.10
In particular, the model rationalizes a set of stylized facts concerning the rise of
polarization noted in McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006): not only has polarization
risen even when controlling for the demographic characteristics of the electorate and
the candidate, but said characteristics remain statistically and economically signifi-
cant. In fact, as polarization has risen, the importance of the voter demographics for
policy outcomes has risen as well! These facts are difficulties for models which rely
on the increasing homogeneity of parties alone to explain polarization, as well as for
those models which credit institutional changes. By contrast, the model is able to
explain this problem: as groups self-segregate, the accuracy of their beliefs become
more asymmetric with respect to candidates of the different parties, driving polar-
ization; however, in any given district, the median of the voting population, around
which both parties diverge, will become more dependent on the differentiated un-
derlying characteristics of the district. Meanwhile, candidate demographics remain
important, as their cultural base will depend on those with whom they can more
easily communicate, which is likely dependent on their socioeconomic descriptors.
The imperfect beliefs voting model offers an alternative, consistent explanation
for outcomes that had previously been credited as evidence to the citizen-candidate
10Recall Figure 1. The relative shock to polarization over the last half-century has occurred
simultaneously with a move to the suburbs which has segregated the relatively wealthy from the
relatively poor. This would be expected to reduce the social interactions between the groups that
are likely to have different policy preferences, increasing the difficulty of communication and the
passive acquisition of information across groups. In addition, as discussed above, this is the same
period as we have seen the two parties diverge on a number of socioeconomic indicators. Therefore,
it seems much more likely that we are in a world of divergent bases than one in which communication
is independent of preferences. Indeed, as the model predicts, we have seen massive and continuous
policy divergence between the two parties as this social segregation occurs.
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model (e.g. Pande (2003)). For example, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) observe
that quotas requiring that some districts only offer female candidates in India have
led to public goods being offered which are preferred by women. While this has often
been cited in support of citizen-candidate, the imperfect beliefs voting model shows
how such results could be driven by the fact that now only candidates who can com-
municate perfectly with female voters are being nominated, while before candidates
tended to be able to communicate more easily with men. Such an alternative result
is consistent with Stadelmann, Portmann and Eichenberger (2014), which found that
there was generally no difference between male and female politicians except on social
and redistributive issues, which are the most likely to be clouded by differences be-
tween gendered language. In this way, the imperfect beliefs voting model offers many
opportunities to add to the exploration of particularistic public goods provision.
The imperfect beliefs voting model also addresses concerns with primary-based
explanations for divergence, such as Alesina and Holden 2008 and Agranov 2012.
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) actually show that polarization decreased in
the United States as political primaries became more widespread. The imperfect
beliefs voting model does not rely on such institutional structures to drive its results.
The model provides an explanation for the a priori strange result that the rise of
primaries in the United States may have actually reduced polarization between the
parties.
In order to test the model against other voting models which generate political
polarization, there need to be additional testable implications. First, let us consider
one party's base becoming more extreme:
Proposition 2: Suppose f ′ is convex. If H shifts to the right (i.e. H ′ strictly
first-order stochastically dominates H) in a way that preserves xmed, both P 1 and P 2
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diverge from the median voter, with party 2 diverging by a greater amount.
The same is true if G shifts to the left in a similar fashion.
As one cultural group begins to have a more extreme base, both parties may
diverge further from the median than the symmetric case of Theorem 1. For the
party that has more extreme members in its base, the effect is clear as the center of
gravity among the group they can communicate with more easily has moved away from
the median and towards the edge. In fact, the group becoming more heterogeneous
moves farther away from the median. Interestingly, the party whose base stays the
same also diverges as long as the mass of the error distribution is sufficiently near
0. This seems like a natural extension of the assumption of convexity of f, as small
errors in beliefs are significantly more likely than large errors, particularly in the age
of free information. They now have less worry that moderate members of their own
base may believe the opposition is better for them through imperfect beliefs, since
their errors would need to be even larger to make such a mistake. In addition, since
moderate members of the other cultural base perfectly observe the party becoming
more extreme, they will notice the divergence and, ceteris paribus, will need a smaller
error in beliefs to vote for the opposite party. Therefore, even the party that has the
more moderate base has an incentive to, in effect, radicalize, as they will prefer to
gain their own outer supporters with near certainty and risk that errors in belief will
allow them to gain moderates from the other side.
Furthermore, the less extreme party will also win a larger share of voters:
Property 2: As H shifts to the right, the vote share of 1 will increase, and
vice-versa for 2.
Consider moderate members of the party with a more extreme base. They per-
fectly observe that their own party has radicalized. Inherently, this makes them less
23
likely to vote for the candidate of their own social group. As stated above, the party
of the other social group will also diverge farther, making it unlikely that moderate
voters will be better off switching; however, they view that other candidate with some
error, and therefore will potentially miss his more radical platform. Therefore, since
the more homogenous social group candidate did not diverge as much as the hetero-
geneous candidate with more extreme observers, in expectation he will increase his
vote share from the other candidate's base.
Indeed, if we look at the American National Economic Survey on voter preferences
and compare the data to politician voting habits via DW Nominate scores, we find
the results in Figures 4 and 5: the percentage of Democratic voters who describe
themselves as extremely liberal and the percentage of Republican voters who describe
themselves as extremely conservative tracks the rise in political divergence (Carroll
et al. (2013); American National Election Studies (2014)). This is not polarization of
the general population, but simply better sorting into the parties (Fiorina, Abrams
and Pope (2005)). Figures 4 and 5 are in line with the model: as more extreme voters
sort into the same political parties, both parties diverge from one another. Such an
exercise is not a perfect test of the model's predictions: ideally we'd compare party
platforms within elections, but the model is broadly consistent with the stylized facts
we observe concerning polarization and elections.
We also need to consider the case where one party is a natural majority. This
is the case where one party can communicate more easily with the majority in the
population.11 This is additionally analogous to countries where one ethnic group
11Consider a political economist running for office. Since academic economists make up a van-
ishingly small proportion of the population, while simultaneously speaking our own idiosyncratic
language, it is reasonable that in an election between an economist and a non-economist, the non-
economist would be able to better communicate with virtually everyone in the voting population.
In the imperfect beliefs voting model, this is represented by µ → 0 if party 1's slew of candidates
are made up of entirely economists.
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Figure 4: Figure 5:
makes up the vast proportion of the voter population. In such cases, the median
voter is the median of party 2's base, and we converge to a Theorem 2 equilibrium:
Proposition 3: As µ → 0, both parties converge to the median voter if H is
symmetric; similarly, as µ→ 1 if G is symmetric.
Otherwise, as µ→ 0, party 2 converges to the median voter, but party 1 diverges;
and vice-versa for µ→ 0.
Intuitively, the natural majority leads to a return of convergence if and only if
the natural majority has symmetric preferences. As µ→ 1 or 0, it effectively returns
to a case where preferences are independent from communication; the difference here
is that there is still one party that has trouble communicating with what is now
the general population. Therefore, we effectively recover the Theorem 2 equilibrium
where bases are identical, since the minority party's base is of no consequence.
For most of the last century, the Democratic party has been the majority party
of the United States, at times even reaching a majority of the voting population.
Therefore, by the above, as the size of the Democratic base decreases, divergence from
the median voter of both parties will increase if the party bases are symmetrically
distributed within. As expected, ANES and DW-Nominate data shows just that, as
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Figure 6:
displayed in Figure 6.
Abstracting from absolute majority cases, this can lead to interesting policy re-
sults. Given strong enough polarization between social groups, both in terms of policy
preferences and social communication, it is possible to rationalize almost any policy
outcome that may be observed from a politician. On the one hand, such a possibility
is extremely frustrating for an econometrician looking for clean identification. On the
other hand, the model provides a format through which we can analyze seemingly
unusual policy outcomes, by focusing on the social groups that support political par-
ties and their interactions with one another. Just such a project will be undertaken
in section 6.
1.6 Application: Redistribution and the Size of Government
One of the most important questions in positive political economy is the relationship
between inequality and real economic outcomes. In particular, there has long existed
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an intuition that the distribution of material wealth within a society will have an
impact on the size and role of government within that nation, either via public goods
allocations or direct redistribution and/or social insurance. Typically, such analysis
is pursued via a standard model of redistributive taxation as popularized by Meltzer
and Richard (1981). The model contains a continuum of voters who only differ
over their effective wages. They first vote between candidates who campaign over
a redistributive program that taxes income and redistributes evenly to the entire
population. They then choose how much to work based upon the policy selected by
the winning candidate. This can and has been easily modified to consider the cases
of public goods, unemployment insurance, and other measures of general government
involvement, but I will limit myself to the straight redistribution case.
In the standard framework, any individual voter's optimal tax policy would be
represented by:






where wi represents the individual specific wage, li represents labor hours selected, V
is a well-behaved, increasing, and convex disutility from labor, and τ represent the
government linear tax rate. The key result is that voters who have effective wages
less than the average will prefer some level of redistribution, decreasing in their wage,
while voters who are capable of earning wages higher than the average will prefer
income subsidies.
Within a traditional Downsian model, we expect the median voter's preferred
policy to represent the platform of both parties:
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This derives a set of major expected results based upon a specific measure of inequal-
ity: the spread between the median and mean wages. Since wages and incomes tend
to follow a log-normal distribution, the median wage will be less than the mean. A
model with perfect observability, therefore, provides us with clear comparative statics:
Downsian with Perfect Observability Results:
1. Government will be inefficiently large by a utilitarian metric, with the level of
inefficiency increasing in the level of inequality;
2. An increase in the wage held by the rich, holding the median wage constant, will
increase the size of government;
3. An decrease in the wage of the poor, holding the median wage constant, will
decrease the size of government.
These results are driven by the fact that the median voter will pick a preferred tax
rate based upon how much he expects to gain on net. Since he expects to receive the
tax rate multiplied by mean income, while losing the tax rate multiplied by his own
income, a larger amount of inequality will increase the mean wage relative to his own
and increase his net gains. In contrast, when poverty increases, there is less to gain
from a high tax rate, and therefore he will tend to prefer relatively small government.
The empirical data on the role of inequality on the size of government is, however,
mixed (see de Mello and Tiongson (2006) for an overview); therefore, there is a grow-
ing literature attempting to find other sources of interaction between rising inequality
and positive political outcomes.
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Within the framework of the model, preferences are distributed from τ∗min to
τ∗max as defined in (7) above. Within the United States, parties are divided by mea-
sures of income, with the division occurring near the median voter's preferences (Pew
(2012)). In addition, there is substantial evidence of citizens in both the United States
and Europe sorting into neighborhoods and social groups based upon their income.
Such sorting is consistent with evidence presented by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal
(2006) that district level income has only begun to matter for policy outcomes since
the 1990s; prior to that, the rich and poor were relatively mixed within the same
districts and had more similar social behaviors. Therefore, let us consider party bases
divided on the following assumption:
Assumption 3: G ∼ [τ∗min, τ∗med ≤ b] and H ∼ [c ≤ τ∗med, τ∗max]
In a world in which assumption 3 holds, candidate one is observed better by poorer
voters, while candidate 2 is observed more easily by the rich. This provides a set of
results that may more realistically match the empirical evidence than the model with
perfect observability:
Result: P 1 will offer a larger tax rate than τ∗med, and P 2 < τ∗med.
Let P 1 = τ ∗med +. Then, P 2 < τ ∗med −.
This is a direct result of Theorem 1. The candidate of the rich will have an
incentive to offer less redistribution in order to limit the chance that moderately
wealthy voters will vote for the other candidate, and vice-versa for the candidate of
the poor. Therefore, ex ante, we could see either a small government candidate or a
big government candidate win the election.
Due to the skewed nature of the income distribution, the difference between the
wage of the richest and the wage of the median will be larger than the difference
between that of the median and the poorest. By extension, the rich voters will prefer
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even smaller government relative to the median voter than the poorer voter will
prefer large government. Therefore, the candidate of the rich has a more extreme
base, ranging from those who prefer a mildly large government to those who prefer a
radically small government that incentivizes work. Therefore, in order to maximize
his chances of holding onto the richest members of his base, the rich candidate must
be more extreme than his poor counterpart.
This, however, raises questions about efficiency. Recall that τ∗med is not efficient;
it is too large. Therefore, while he will be more extreme in the sense of distance
from the median voter, it is possible that the candidate supported by a rich base
will actually offer the more efficient policy. Recall that the level of divergence will be
determined by the level of heterogeneity in the population as a whole and in the level of
noise in platform signaling. In this case, the latter is the level of cultural polarization
between rich and poor. Therefore, with a culture that is relatively socially cohesive,
the rich candidate will offer a more efficient policy, as the pull towards their cultural
base will be small enough that they will simply approach the efficient point. This is
a case in which some social separation and/or some inequality may be beneficial, as
it pulls away from the inefficient median voter policy and towards the more efficient
mean policy. Evidence for such nonlinearities in social separation have been found in
the data (e.g. Figini (1998); Bassett, Burkett and Putterman (1999)).
Even in the static case, there are two problems with advocating for more socioe-
conomic dispersion as a panacea for inefficient policy making. Under certain circum-
stances, the candidate of the rich will offer a more efficient policy than in a situation
with perfect social cohesion, the party of the poor will always offer an even more
inefficiently large government than under the median voter case. By the following,
pi > 1
2
, whereby the big government candidate is more likely to win:
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Result: The party with the poorer base will win a larger vote share.
Therefore, when society is less cohesive and interaction between the rich and poor
is reduced, it is more likely that we will see inefficiently large government of an even
greater size than with perfect observation.
Even for the candidate of the rich, efficiency will only be improved over the Median
Voter Theorem for a sufficiently small amount of noise and/or level of inequality.
Given too much inequality and/or too much noise, the rich candidate will offer a
government that is inefficiently smaller than the median voter's preference. Note also,
by Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, further socioeconomic polarization or inequality
will also be driving the candidate of the poor to support even larger government.
Therefore, beyond a certain point, cultural polarization will lead both candidates to
offer very inefficient policies: one that is too large, and one that is too small.
By Proposition 2, any increase in inequality will have the effect of increasing policy
divergence. Intuitively, this is consistent with the idea that parties seek to balance
locking down base voters within their own party with competing for moderates of
the other party, and that increased spread in preferences will make competing for
voters from the other party relatively more costly. Therefore, one item that has
been previously overlooked in the empirical literature on inequality and the size of
government is the role of inequality in driving polarization in party platforms.
As in the Downsian model, however, the cause of the expected increase in poverty
will impact the expected outcome on policy. The difference in the model is that the
change will depend on the relative probabilities of the two candidates winning rather
than on equilibrium policy. As noted above, any increase in inequality will cause
further divergence in policy platforms; however, property 2 tells us that the cause of
the change in inequality will determine the changes in the vote share:
31
Figure 7:
Result: Suppose f ' is convex.
An increase in the wage of the rich, holding median wages constant, will increase
τ 1 and pi, and will decrease τ 2.
A decrease in the wage of the poor, holding median wages constant, will increase
τ 1, and will decrease τ 2 and pi.
Consider an increase in inequality driven by a rise in wealth at the top (an increase
in wmax in this framework). In this case, the spread of the income distribution within
the base of the upper-class candidate becomes even wider relative to the base of the
lower-class candidate. Therefore, pi rises and the big government candidate becomes
more likely to win. We have two reasons to expect to observe bigger government here:
the big government candidate will want even more redistribution and he will win a
higher vote share. While it is true that the small government candidate will want
even less redistribution, he is similarly less likely to win.
In contrast, when inequality rises due to an increase in poverty (a decrease in
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wmin), this increases the relative spread of the poor candidate's base with respect to
the candidate of the rich. Therefore, while the platform dynamics are the same, in
this case, pi decreases. Thus, the small candidate will become relatively more likely
to win.
Note, however, since incomes are still skewed, pi is still greater than one-half.
Thus, while the candidate of the rich will now offer an even more radical small-
government program and will be more likely to win than he was before, the big
government candidate is still more likely to win ex ante, and he is offering even more
taxes than before. This helps to explain why the evidence for the Downsian model's
claim that increases in poverty will decrease demand for redistribution tend to be
weaker: while the median voter may now prefer relatively smaller government, the
bigger government candidate will still be more likely to win, and now has a party
base that wants even more government taxation and spending.
Indeed, taking data from the World Top Income Database and DW-Nominate
Scores, the rise in inequality strongly tracks the rise in polarization (Alvaredo et al.
(2014)). In Figure 7, I compare the DW-Nominate polarization used above with
the Inverted Pareto-Lorenz Coefficient, which, as explained in Atkinson, Piketty, and
Saez, is a strong determinant of the percentage of wealth increases that will accrue to
the top of the income distribution (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011)). For the sake
of the analysis above, this is exactly what we need, as it holds the total wealth (i.e.
that of the median voter) constant. Therefore, as the model predicts, the increase in
divergence on economic issues is to a large extent driven by an increase in inequality.
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1.7 Discussion of the Model
1.7.1 Beliefs
An alternative explanation for additively symmetric beliefs is that voters must un-
dertake costly interpretation of platforms (e.g. Ergin and Sarver (2010)). We may
consider voters who must expend some cost to interpret the platforms of each candi-
date, and hence their ex-post utility from voting for a particular candidate. In such
an extended model, suppose that both platforms are initially observed as P j + 
j
i for
both candidates, but that the voters may expend some cost ψj to reduce σj, therefore
reducing their expected error. If a voter in the base of candidate 1 must expend a
higher marginal cost to interpret the policy position of candidate 2, their ex-post error
|2i | will be higher in expectation. We can therefore think of δ as being isomorphic to
the cost of interpretation. The beliefs of the imperfect beliefs voting model are hence
generated by the simplified scenario in which the marginal cost of interpreting a base
candidate is zero, while being positive for the other candidate.
Search for information is also left unmodeled. Therefore, δ can also be interpreted
as containing the difference in free (i.e. available without search) information avail-
able to members of a party's cultural base. This is the information that is picked up
tacitly via day to day interaction with different groups of people. Thus, even though
the internet has lowered the cost of acquiring information, it has also allowed greater
freedom to choose particular sources, thereby increasing the asymmetry of informa-
tion acquired for free by those who participate in certain social circles related to one
candidate versus those related to the other. As voters are no longer exposed to the
same baseline set of information and are given the ability to limit their exposure to
ideologically discordant content (e.g. Bakshy, Messing and Adamic (2015)), we can
consider this an increase in sociocultural distance in beliefs, and hence δ.
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These results are also equivalent to a model with bounded rationality, in the sense
that voters simply vote their beliefs without showing any concern for the possibility
that they are wrong; they are unaware of the model. In general, this irrationality is
both consistent with the literature on turnout (in which voters who show up for elec-
tions tend to believe that they have strong information) and actual voter behavior. In
addition, due to the well-recognized incentive for voters to be ignorant and irrational
due to their vanishingly small probability of affecting outcomes, it seems consistent
to assume that they would not spend significant time modifying their voting behavior
for the possibility of error. As noted by Schumpeter (1942): The typical citizen drops
down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field.
He argues and analyzes in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within
the sphere of his real interests.
It does seem reasonable that voters will use heuristics such as party and candidate
history to aid in their voting decisions. For an overview of this literature, see Hinich
and Munger (1996) and Lupia and McCubbins (1998). Indeed, Lau and Redlawsk
(2001) showed that at least 75 percent of voters made the correct decision with
respect to their policy preferences. However, these results are ex post, ignoring the
strategic role of the possibility for ex-post errors in candidate policy settings. Indeed,
in equilibrium, the two parties will differentiate themselves enough such that voters
are less likely to make ex-post errors. In addition, note that the use of heuristics
actually makes those voters who do not receive precise signals less elastic with respect
to opposing candidate policies, and therefore further reduces the incentive to appeal
to these voters, increasing divergence in any equilibrium.
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1.7.2 Cultural Bases
It is the potential asymmetry in bases which will drive the important results, so it is
useful to explore the rationale for this assumption. Parties draw their candidates from
a pool of members (in our terminology, from their base) who will possess certain traits,
sociological characteristics, and verbal characteristics. This is explicit in nations with
a number of particular dialects, such as many Asian and African polities. Even within
the United States, however, terms such as liberty, freedom, and education take on
very different meanings for different groups of people. Therefore, even if the candidate
wishes to signal his platform perfectly, he will only be able to do so for those who
are most similar to him and/or who run in social circles where his positions are more
widely known (the other members of the base). While it may be possible, or even
virtually costless, for voters within the other base to determine his platform, they are
unlikely to be willing to invest much, if anything, to acquire this information.
Consider, for example, the use of the term welfare within the economics profes-
sion in contrast to the general population. When an economist discusses maximizing
welfare, he would simply mean improving quality of life; many others would hear the
same phrase and believe that the economist means to increase the size of what is
commonly referred to as the welfare state. A cursory internet search would allow one
to square the circle, so to speak, but does one expect the voter, knowing that she is
unlikely to make a difference in end policy regardless of her vote, to take the time
and effort to do so?
Being within a party's base is not the same thing as being a member of that party;
it simply means that that party can credibly signal his intentions to you, and therefore
you can have more certainty over what they are offering should they be elected. The
concept of cultural bases is analogous to the parties having a comparative advantage
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in communicating with and being observed by certain groups of voters. Within Online
Appendix B, I relax this assumption, allowing some voters to be either within the base
of both parties, or neither, and allowing the cultural base to have noisy, albeit less
noisy, beliefs. Generically, this leads to relatively more convergence, as the incentives
of the two parties are more in line, but does not distort the qualitative results.
Another justification for the assumption of separate bases comes from the realm
of media choice. As media choices on television, and particularly the internet, have
proliferated, so too have the focuses and political slants of these mediums. Voters,
facing a limited amount of time and desire to consume news sources, tend to sort
by demographics into viewership cohorts which consume news specifically targeted
towards them. Political affiliations tend to be one of the most important determinants
of media choice, and therefore these sources have an incentive to provide more accurate
information on the parties and candidates represented by viewers (see e.g. Groseclose
and Milyo (2005); Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005); Prior (2005); Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2006); Duggan and Martinelli (2010); Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010); Puglisi
(2011)). Therefore, we can consider candidate cultural bases to be the viewers of
news networks that favor (in terms of accuracy) a particular candidate (i.e. Fox
News for Republicans, MSNBC for Democrats). Since they will be gaining accurate
information about one candidate on average, they will have a more refined signal of
that candidate's platform, while they will be left with whatever passive information
they acquire concerning the other candidate.
Note that property 1 provides a connection between the model's definition of a
base and the intuitive notion of a candidate's base being those voters who the candi-
date must win in order to take an election. Base voters will be those whom are most
responsive to the candidate's policy pronunciations, and, therefore, on equilibrium
path they will vote for the candidate with higher probability. These are the voters to
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whom the candidate will primarily seek to appeal. Therefore, an evangelical Chris-
tian candidate such as Mike Huckabee will seek to win evangelical Christians first and
foremost, while an older veteran such as John McCain will focus on older voters with
connections to the military. These will not be the only voters they seek out, but they
will be the voters who take priority. Note that, unlike models of valance, these voters
are not defined as exogenous voters who will naturally vote for these candidates, but
instead arise endogenously as they are easier to be reached by said candidates.
1.8 Conclusion
In the previous literature, Downsian convergence was the norm and divergent out-
comes were the cause of some external force, such as lobbying or commitment prob-
lems combined with personal candidate preferences, and therefore policy solutions to
divergence have focused on regulating these areas through campaign finance reform
and gender/racial quotas within legislatures. The imperfect beliefs voting model,
however, shows another explanation for divergence: voters are rationally ignorant
over policy and have little incentive to improve upon such ignorance combined with
the fact that it is more difficult to communicate information to groups with whom
you have less in common. When the core supporters of the two parties communicate
less with each other, then voters are marginally more valuable to those whom they
observe better. Therefore, unless the candidates and bases are perfectly identical, we
will not have convergence to the median voter, but instead the divergence which we
witness in reality.
This changes the role that culture and communication play in policy formation. As
communities and cultures become polarized, their politics will become more polarized
as well. It does not necessarily matter if the politics are polarized in and of themselves:
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as long as communication is symmetric for the two parties, we may still get the
median voter outcome. It is usually when right-wingers and left-wingers come from
different socioeconomic groups that do not communicate well with each other that
we get divergence. This has potential implication for public goods and inequality,
particularly in ethnically diverse developing countries, which need to be explored.
In some ways, the imperfect beliefs voting model underestimates the divergent
behavior in political parties; politicians likely have some personal policy preferences
as subjects to the laws that they will pass, and will therefore take advantage of
their imperfect observability to pull policies towards their own preferences. This
is particularly true if those with more extreme preferences are those more likely to
be drawn to politics. In addition, when considering incumbency and the potential
of having held office prior to election, it seems likely that there will always be one
candidate whom voters can observe more perfectly.
The model should be extended to a dynamic setting to find implications for party
formation, since the ethnic and cultural components of a party are not in fact ex-
ogenous and static, as modeled here. In addition, voters will have idiosyncratic ways
of thinkign about campaigns and will respond differently to differing messages. This
has clear strategic implications for parties over and across campaign cycles, and could
help shed light on why campaigns matter at all.
The same case can be made for using the imperfect beliefs voting model to examine
candidate selection, which would provide additional testable implications between the
model and citizen-candidate models. One could imagine that such repetition would
allow the use of heuristics to form prior over party and/or candidate behavior, though,
as discussed above, such priors will actually increase political polarization as voters
with noisier beliefs become even less elastic to party policy platforms. Therefore, the
model implies that an increase in polarization is potentially a natural outcome of
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voter learning over time.
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2 Incentives to Take Care under Contributory and
Comparative Negligence
2.1 Introduction
For accidental injuries, tort law requires negligence on the part of the defendant for
the plaintiff to recover damages. Relatively early in the common law, courts developed
the doctrine of contributory negligence, which provided that a plaintiff who was guilty
of negligence could not recover damages against a defendant who was also negligent.
This put the emphasis on negligence as a standard for sharing the risks associated
with care, intended to induce potential tortfeasors to internalize the costs of their
actions and engage in socially efficient behavior.
The harshness of the contributory negligence rule led many legislatures (the ma-
jority at present) and some courts (for example, Georgia) to soften its impact by in-
troducing a comparative negligence rule. Under comparative negligence, a negligent
plaintiff is permitted to recover some percentage of his damages against a negligent
defendant, depending on the court's assessment of the degree to which each party's
negligence contributed to the cause of the accident (e.g., Moffitt v. Carroll, 640 A.2d
169 (Del. 1994)).
One of the most important questions in the economic analysis of law is the extent
to which comparative negligence affects deterrence  specifically, the incentive to take
care  in comparison to the older rule of contributory negligence. In an important
paper that was the first to analyze the incentive question, Brown (1973) found that
the contributory negligence rule generated optimal deterrence incentives. However,
he concluded that comparative negligence led to suboptimal incentives. This con-
clusion stood until Haddock and Curran (1985), Cooter and Ulen (1986), and Rea
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(1987), using more accurate specifications of the comparative negligence rule, showed
that incentives for care are optimal under comparative negligence, just as under con-
tributory negligence, when considering cases of bilateral harm (i.e., both parties can
be victims). Indeed, Haddock and Curran actually show that comparative negligence
may be superior if courts do not have perfect information and therefore make mistakes
in assessing negligence, though Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003) find less support for
this argument. A literature begun by Orr (1991) and Chung (1993) further found that
this equivalence held in cases of unilateral harm as well. These equivalence results
have been incorporated into the major texts on the incentives of torts (e.g., Landes
and Posner (1987); Shavell (1987)).
The equivalence results have relied on two major assumptions: one explicit and
one implicit. The earlier papers have all assumed that when courts apply the Hand
Formula to determine the negligence of a party, they follow a two-step process: first,
they determine the global optimal level of care for both parties, and then they de-
termine whether the parties accused of negligence met that level of care. In short,
the negligence test is derived from conditions specifying optimal care levels for each
party. The informational burdens assumed to be borne by courts implementing this
process are enormous. And, implicitly, any potential negligence case that reaches
courts would be such that full care (i.e., both sides taking care) is the social opti-
mum, despite the fact that there are negligence cases that reach the court even when
care is not socially optimal.
We depart from this standard framework in two respects, allowing us to exam-
ine the operation of the negligence standard when courts are not perfectly capable
of calculating or requiring globally optimal care. First, recognizing that significant
discretion is available to plaintiffs over what particular care decisions will be consid-
ered in court, we assume plaintiffs explicitly accuse the alleged tortfeasor of some
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discrete failure to take a precaution, as in Grady (1989) and Feldman and Frost
(1998).12Second, and more importantly, we assume that courts apply the Hand For-
mula in an informationally constrained manner. Specifically, instead of determining
optimal care ex ante for all scenarios, as implicit in a theoretically proper application
of the Hand Formula, we assume courts apply the test using the localized algorithm
framed by the law, examining whether care, a simultaneous decision, is optimal for
the injurer given that the victim was also taking care. Under this informationally
constrained model, richer strategic incentives emerge (encompassing the equivalence
results as special cases), which allow for the possibility that the court may find a
party negligent, because taking care is optimal given that the other party takes care,
even if a lack of care by both parties would be the social optimum. Such defensive
care equilibria have not been suggested in the previous theoretical literature, though
empirical evidence suggests that they may be economically significant (e.g., Kessler
and McClellan (1996)).
Assuming an informationally constrained application of the Hand Formula strikes
us as appropriate for several reasons. First, the localized algorithm is precisely what
the law requires judges to apply; nothing in the formal legal test requires or even
instructs judges to find the social optimum. Second, even if a judge were to attempt
to determine whether the locally optimal care outcome is also jointly optimal for the
parties, he or she may simply lack the information or skills necessary to make such a
determination. Third, as decisions on a specific and recurrent negligence charge (e.g.,
is phone use while driving negligent?) accumulate, courts establish precedent to which
they try to adhere in future cases and may therefore forgo an effort to calculate optimal
care ex ante in alternative scenarios. Fourth, in professional malpractice cases, courts
12We note that discrete care is not necessary for our results. However, the assumption is consistent
with most of the torts cases (Grady, 1989), and offers more plausible conditions for some of our results
than the continuous care scenario.
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generally consult professional norms to determine negligence rather than attempt
to determine globally optimal care.13These reasons suggest that it is worthwhile to
examine the incentives generated by the contributory negligence standard when it is
applied not as economists theorize but as the law actually requires.
When we - realistically in view of informational constraints - frame the application
of the Hand Formula as whether the cost of the care under consideration is less than
the reduction in expected harm given that the other party is taking care (e.g., McCarty
v. Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir 1987); Davis v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 788 F. 2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1986); Hession v. Liberty Asphalt Products,
Inc., 235 N.E.2d 17, 22 (Ill.1968); LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St.
Paul Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 352 (1914)), we find that there are substantive differences
between the two negligence rules driven by the strategic implications of dual care.
With unilateral harm, contributory negligence creates weakly greater incentives for
care. It does so when there is a strong strategic complementarity in care, by creating
an incentive for the potential victim to take care even when he expects the injurer
will not in order to foist the residual liability onto the other party. Expecting this
behavior, the injurer will also take care, even when it is not socially optimal for either
party to do so - i.e., we observe defensive care. Therefore, comparative negligence is
weakly socially dominant despite having weaker incentives for care, as it forces both
parties to share damages in cases where both fail to take care.
With bilateral harm, by contrast, it is possible for comparative negligence to
13For example, a court conducting a contributory negligence evaluation in a medical malpractice
case would ask whether it was negligent for the patient not to take care given that the physician
complied with the professional custom (see, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.
1972)). Obviously, professional customs are likely to reflect the same factors examined in the Hand
analysis. But the tendency to focus on custom implies a low likelihood that a court would rigorously
evaluate optimality under all of the alternatives in a specific dispute. In one rare case where a court
rejected the customary approach, Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974), its decision was
legislatively overruled.
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have one party over-internalizing the potential harms, and hence taking care even
when it is not socially optimal if one expects to bear a majority of the burden.
Therefore, contributory negligence is weakly socially dominant despite having weaker
incentives for care. In other words, it is always optimal to have both parties share risk
when neither takes care. Therefore, whether contributory or comparative negligence
dominates will depend on what would occur naturally when neither party takes care
(i.e., both sharing risk in the case of bilateral harm, or one bearing all the risk in the
case of unilateral harm).
The key changes in our results are driven by the strategic implications of dual care,
which have received insufficient attention in law and economics models. Most previous
comparisons of contributory and comparative negligence missed the possibility of
strategic complementarity, which allows one party to de facto create negligence on
the part of a party not taking care. Our emphasis on the strategic behavior of agents
formalizes some of the intuitive arguments of Grady (1990), who first identified the
phenomenon of strategic foisting of liability. Therefore, choice of negligence regime
(or of risk sharing within comparative negligence regimes) can dampen excessive care
incentives that such foisting creates. Indeed, when costs of care differ greatly, strategic
foisting undermines the cheapest-cost-avoider rationale familiar in the literature since
Calabresi (1970).
Our results lead to simple recommendations for courts and legislatures when de-
termining which negligence rule is optimal. When bilateral harm obtains and costs
of care are symmetric (e.g., automobile accidents), contributory negligence leads to
socially preferable incentives; by contrast, with either unilateral harm or asymmetric
costs of care, comparative negligence leads to optimal incentives by creating sym-
metry between the agents. When considering the specific question of how generally to
divide damages conditional on both sides being found negligent, we show that dam-
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ages should be split based upon cost of care - i.e., those facing higher costs should pay
a greater share if neither takes care. Since some legal tests in contract law and even
in criminal law depend on a reasonableness inquiry analogous to the Hand Formula,
our model has applications beyond the accident law setting.
We note that this is not a model of error in application of the Hand test. Courts
apply the test accurately in this model, but the localized procedure framed by the
test, accurately applied, generates inefficient care equilibria.
In section 2, we discuss a motivating example. Section 3 discusses the general
results under bilateral and unilateral harm, respectively, as well as when the costs of
care differ. We conclude with a discussion of the relevant case law.
2.2 Example
2.2.1 Bilateral Harm
Consider the case of two drivers on a road, driving in opposite directions. Both want
to stay in touch with associates to coordinate plans (e.g., where to meet, to resolve
emergencies, etc.), and therefore both would prefer to use their phones to talk or send
text messages while driving. Suppose the cost of not using the phone while driving
(i.e., taking care) is the monetary equivalent of $20 to each driver.
Of course, driving without care makes an accident more likely. If both drive
without using their phones, there will never be an accident. By contrast, if they both
use their phones while driving an accident will be expected to occur 1
4
of the time. If
only one uses his phone, but the other remains careful, an accident will occur 3
16
of
the time. Note that under these assumptions care by only one party generates only a
modest reduction in the accident likelihood compared to the case where neither party
takes care.
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Whether or not the two drivers take care will of course be dependent on the
expected cost should they get into an accident, and the expected response of a court
should an accident occur. Suppose the cost of an accident (or harm) is $75 to each
driver, and the drivers face a contributory negligence regime.
Note that the Hand Formula is met, as the added benefit of care ( 3
16
∗ $150 =
$28.125) is greater than the cost of added care. If a driver expects the other driver
on the road to take care, he will do so himself. However, if he expects the other
not to take care, he only faces expected damages of $18.75. Therefore, if the other
driver is expected to drive negligently, so will the first driver. There are two realistic
outcomes: either both parties will drive without care, or neither will.
Which equilibrium is dominant? Note that if both take care, the total cost is
$40. By contrast, if neither takes care, the expected cost is only $37.50. Therefore,
a utilitarian social planner would prefer driving without care, since the value to the
drivers of using their phones outweighs the expected damage to the vehicles.
How would these stories change if the drivers faced a comparative negligence
regime? Consider a case where one driver is driving a foreign-made sedan while the
other is driving a domestic sports car. In this case, it is still reasonable that expected
damage to the two vehicles from an accident would be symmetric (as importing parts
from overseas is more expensive, all else equal, than domestic parts, even if those
parts are for a sports car), but it is also reasonable that the driver of the sports car
expects that, given both were careless, he would still be held more responsible by a
jury.14 In particular, suppose he expects to have to pay 75% of damages if both did
not take care.
14The jury, not present at the time of the accident, infers relative responsibility based on objective
features of the litigants. Thus, if one driver is in a sports car and the other in a sedan, the jury may
infer that the sports car driver has a greater degree of responsibility - and the same is likely to be
true if one driver is male and the other female, or if one driver is the active force while the other
passive.
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Obviously, the sedan driver will not take care if he expects sports cars to not take
care, since he now faces even smaller damages than in the previous case. However,
the sports car driver now has a dominant strategy of not using his phone. Expecting
careful coupes, the sedan will also drive carefully, and we now have a unique outcome:
both drivers take care.
Therefore, comparative negligence in this case eliminates the efficient equilibrium
and leaves only the inefficient defensive care equilibrium. Comparative negligence
with sufficiently asymmetric expected fault can actually lead to too much care.
Finally, why doesn't the court simply eliminate the inefficient defensive care equi-
librium on its own? To do so would require the judge to step beyond what the legal
test requires and rank the full-care and no-care outcomes in terms of efficiency, and
a judge would have no clear incentive to take on such extra effort. Having applied
the test as framed by the law, the judge would have no reason to expend effort to
reexamine his conclusion. In addition, if a judge were (perhaps irrationally) to ex-
pend the extra effort, ranking outcomes in terms of efficiency would require the judge
to know that the equilibrium in which both parties use their phones is superior to
that in which both parties refrain from phone use, and there are several reasons a
judge may not have or acquire such knowledge. One, the court may have established
an earlier precedent, based on different and more numerous cases, that phone use
while driving is negligent, and therefore may not examine de novo the efficiency of
the outcome in which both sides take care in this case (or, having examined it, may
perceive the cost of deviating from precedent as too high). Alternatively, the court
may only know a range for the cost of care (e.g., between $17 and $20), and would
therefore be able to conduct the negligence test accurately while being unable to ac-
curately determine global optimality. Obviously, one could offer several variations on
each of these explanations to suggest why a court might forgo the effort to rank the
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efficiency of full-care versus no-care.
2.2.2 Unilateral Harm
Now consider a case of a doctor and patient. If the doctor fails to take care, only
the patient will be hurt. Suppose the cost of taking care for each is still $20, as the
patient still needs to follow proper guidelines for his own safety, and the probabilities
remain the same as above. Let the cost in extra medical bills, lost time, etc. to the
patient be $150 (keeping the Hand Formula analysis constant).
Again, let us first consider contributory negligence. It is a dominant strategy
for the patient to be careful since the doctor would still be found negligent for not
taking care. Therefore, the unique outcome is for both the doctor and patient to be
careful. Note here, however, that the cost of both being careful ($40) is larger than the
expected cost of not taking care ($37.50). Therefore, there is actually an inefficient
amount of care being exercise - and the doctor's care could be viewed as defensive
medicine. The court may fail to eliminate this possible inefficient equilibrium because
of information or doctrinal constraints. For example, if the full care equilibrium is
consistent with the general medical custom, even though inefficient in this particular
case, the court may neglect to evaluate its overall efficiency.15
Now consider comparative negligence analysis. In particular, say that a court will
find both parties equally at fault if the doctor and patient both failed to take care to
avoid an accident. As before, both parties will take care if they expect the other to
do so, and therefore the overly careful equilibrium still exists. Now, however, both
15Indeed, suppose the custom itself is determined using the same localized methodology as the
Hand test. Then the court clearly would not eliminate the inefficient outcome. Conversely, even if
the custom is consistent with the no-care equilibrium, if the court is unlikely to eliminate it because of
legal precedent, the excessive care outcome will again be observed, this time with defensive medicine
in excess of the custom. According to some commentators, medical practice has been altered by
legal precedent which effectively establishes the standard of care in some settings Anderson (1999).
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parties expect to pay only $75 with probability 1
4
if there is an accident, instead of
the patient expecting to pay the full $150. In this case, the expected damage is only
$18.75, which is less than the cost. Therefore, a socially optimal equilibrium in which
neither party takes care now exists. The splitting of damages under comparative
negligence creates an efficient equilibrium by forcing both sides to internalize the cost
in cases of unilateral harm.
2.3 General Results
2.3.1 Care Under Bilateral Harm
We continue with the assumption of a binary care decision. As discussed above, the
assumption of a binary care decision is closer to the actual considerations that will
be made by courts: was a particular decision to take or not take a precaution socially
optimal conditional on the assumption of care given the other actor?16 Specifically,
we will focus on three probabilities:
• p = probability of injury when neither party takes care,
• p = probability of injury when only one party takes care, and
• q = probability of injury when both parties take care
For simplicity, let us assume that x is the cost of care and v is the expected loss,
which are both symmetric for A and B.
When an accident occurs, both parties suffer v. An actor is negligent, under the
Hand Formula, if he fails to take care and x < 2(p − q)v. When both actors take
care, each bears the cost x+ qv, because each incurs the cost of taking care and must
suffer his own loss if an accident occurs. When one actor does not take care, and the
16See Grady (1989) for relevant discussion.
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other does, the careless actor bears the cost of his own injury and that of the other if
he is found negligent. Thus, the expected cost for a negligent actor, when the other
actor takes care, is 2pv.
A party will take care, given that he would be negligent if he failed to take care,
if x < (2pi − q)v. Since (2pi − q) > 2(pi − q), it follows that any actor who would be
found negligent will also take care whenever he expects the other to care. If he would
not be found negligent, by contrast, he would never take care since, by construction,
the cost of care is less than the social value of extra care, which is greater than the
private value. In order to focus on cases of strategic interests, from this point forward
let us assume that the Hand Formula binds.
This brings us to the distinction between contributory and comparative negligence.
These fault regimes differ only in their treatment of a lack of care under negligence:
contributory negligence requires that both parties pay their own damages in this
case, while comparative negligence requires that party A pay some share of the total
damages, s, with B paying the remainder. There is no reason to assume that this
s should necessarily correspond to the level of expected harm avoided should they
have taken care.17 For example, given the causal language often used by courts (e.g.,
Moffit v. Carroll, 640 A.2d 169 (Del 1994)), a jury might draw a distinction between
active and passive force in determining the relative damages of two actors, despite the
fact that the passive actor may have been just as able to avoid harm.18 The strategic
incentives can be seen in Table 1.
17See discussion in Rea (1987).
18In reality, most states apply a modified comparative negligence standard in which there is a
threshold that an injurer must reach before she can be found responsible if the other party did not
take care. The results in this paper extend to such a framework, which would only rule out cases in
which the two regimes are equivalent, but would still allow for the possibility of strategic foisting in
cases where the potential injurer expects to be found sufficiently responsible.
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Table 1: Bilateral Harm Care No Care
Care −qv − x,−qv − x −x,−2piv
No Care −2piv,−x −pv (−2spv),−pv (−2(1− s)pv)
Let us consider three different cases with relation to the probabilities of harm
under different levels of care: p, pi, and q :
1. Strategic Substitutes: pi < p+q
2
,












Let us focus for a moment on the meanings of these three possibilities. Strategic
substitutes occur when the majority of the benefit of care comes from the move from
no one caring to one actor caring: in other words, pi−q < p−pi. Therefore, one party
caring lowers the marginal benefit of the other party caring. In this way, care by one
acts as a substitute for care by the other. Consider the case of a pedestrian, crossing
the street, and a car driven at moderate speed; or a car entering a roundabout as
another car circles through. As long as one is paying attention, the probability of an
accident vastly diminishes; while it would fall still farther if the other paid heed, such
additional care would only be mildly effective.
Strategic complements feature the majority of the benefit of care coming when
both parties take care. In this case, the care by one party substantially increases the
marginal benefit of the other taking care. Consider a surgeon and a patient. The
surgeon must decide whether to prepare carefully for a surgery, and the patient must
decide whether to follow doctor's orders concerning what to eat and drink, medicines
to take, and what not to, in the run-up to the procedure. Failure by either will lead
to poor consequences, regardless of what the other does. In this way, the efficacy of
care rises with the actions of the other.
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The differences between strong and weak complements are in how strong this
increase is. With strong complements, the care of one party barely diminishes the
probability of harm if the other does not take care. Take the case of oncoming traffic:
while driving carefully and paying attention reduces the chance of an accident by a
little bit, it does very little to prevent a poor driver from rounding a corner carelessly
and smashing into you: preventing that outcome requires care by both parties.
In the intermediate case of weak strategic complementarity, care by one party is
neither almost sufficient to eliminate the risk, nor of trivial effect. Take the case of
drivers moving relatively fast next to bikers on the shoulder of the road. Care by the
biker will significantly reduce the likelihood of an accident, but there will remain a
substantial risk unless the driver also takes care.
The case of strong strategic complements will be crucial to the analysis within
this paper, as it is the ability of one party's care to shift the marginal incentives for
care of others that will lead to the differences between these two negligence regimes.
Such cases are of significant economic importance.19 Indeed, the concept of strong
strategic complements maps closely to cases of multiple sufficient causes.20 In such
cases, neither party taking care by themselves would prevent an accident, but only
the interaction of the care of both would do so.
2.3.2 Equivalence
We start with the case of equivalence in incentives to take care:
19One important example is Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762 (Conn. 1929). The plaintiff
and defendant were driving in opposite directions on a two-lane highway. The defendant carelessly
veered over into the oncoming lane, forcing the plaintiff, who had been exceeding the speed limit,
to swerve over to the shoulder of the road, damaging his Rolls Royce. The legal issue concerned the
division of damages. For our purposes here, Mahoney is an illustration of the classic strong strategic
complements scenario.
20Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (two negligent shooters, one victim); Kingston v.
Chicago & Northwest Railway Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927)(two negligently-set fires joining and
destroying plaintiff's property).
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Proposition 1: Under bilateral harm, when care is not a strong strate-
gic complement both comparative and contributory negligence generate full
care as the unique outcome.
Recall that the only difference between the two regimes comes in whether an actor
takes care given that the other does not take care. Under contributory negligence,
this means that an actor will take care, given he expects the other will not, if and only
if x
v
< p; the damages he avoids by caring must outweigh the cost. Note, however,
that pi < p
2
+ q ⇒ p > 2(pi − q). Therefore, whenever the Hand formula binds under
non-strong strategic complementarity, care is a dominant strategy. Therefore, in these
cases there is only a unique equilibrium: both parties take care.
Now consider comparative negligence. In this case, one actor will be careful when
x
v
< 2sp and the other when x
v
< 2(1 − s)p. Note that for there to exist a no-care




]. This is only possible when x
v
> p, which is impossible
given the binding Hand Formula. Therefore, at least one actor will always have care
as a dominant strategy, and the unique equilibrium of full care obtains.
2.3.3 Non-Equivalence
However, as shown in our examples earlier, there are opportunities for differences
between comparative and contributory negligence equilibria:
Proposition 2: When care is a strong strategic complement and x
v
∈
[p, 2(pi−q)], both symmetric equilibria (care, care and no care, no care) exist
under contributory negligence. However, if, under comparative negligence,
damages are sufficiently asymmetrically distributed, full care will be the
unique outcome.
First, consider the case when x
v
< p. In this case, since care is a strong strategic
complement, the two parties will be found negligent if they do not take care. By
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the analysis above, we see that under comparative negligence, taking care is always a
dominant strategy for at least one, and in the case of contributory negligence, both,
parties. Therefore, the unique equilibrium of both is full care.
Now, consider the interim case - i.e., strong strategic complementarity and x
v
∈
[p, 2(pi − q)]. Note that under contributory negligence, due to the large increase in
marginal returns when the other is caring, it only becomes worthwhile to take care
if the other does so; otherwise, one would not face negligence in court and would
only pay their own potential damages. By construction, these damages are less than
the cost of care. Therefore, in this area, contributory negligence leads to multiple
equilibria: either both care or neither do.21 Therefore, beliefs, focal points, repetition,
etc. come into play in determining the outcome.22
By contrast, consider comparative negligence. As described above, there does
exist a range of s such that there is a no-care equilibrium. Note, however, that if s
> x
2vp
or s < 1− x
2vp
, there will still be one party that prefers to care even when the
other is not taking care. This is because he will face more than simply his cost, and
therefore will have stronger preferences to avoid paying damages. Note that such a
set of s exists when x
v
< 2p. Since 2p > 2(pi − q) > x
v
, such a set exists. Therefore,
if enough of the fault is expected to fall asymmetrically on one party, the unique
equilibrium of full care will still obtain, unlike in the contributory negligence case.
Figure 1 shows these differences.
21There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium where the probability of care for each side is
x−pv
(2pi−p−q)v .
22For example, consider the case of drivers choosing their speed on the highway. Through expe-
rience, most have learned that the vast majority of other drivers will be going approximately 5-10
miles per hour over the speed limit. Therefore, others can choose to speed (i.e. in our language,
not take care) knowing that if they get in an accident, it will likely be with someone also failing
to take care. This may be a focal point because mild speeding is a socially optimal outcome. It is
reasonable, however, to consider an alternate state of the world in which enough drivers stay under
the speed limit that, through learning, everyone is incentivized to drive carefully; if they did not,
they would risk being found negligent in court. Therefore, questions of repetition which we have left
unmodeled would determine the outcome.
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Indeed, these two results, taken together, allows us to rank the two forms of
negligence in terms of utilitarian efficiency:
Proposition 3: Under bilateral harm, comparative negligence generates
weakly too much care relative to contributory negligence.
To see this, we simply must look at the only range where the two can derive
differing results. Note that, for care to be socially optimal, it must be the case
that x
v
< (p − q). In other words, the cost of care must be less than the expected
benefit in terms of reduced harm. However, note that comparative negligence gets
different results only if x
v
> p > p − q. Therefore, the two differ only if it is socially
optimal for there to be no care. However, recall that the way they differ is that
comparative negligence loses the optimal equilibrium, instead leading to a unique,
full care equilibrium.23 In other words, while we may still get too much care under
23It is worth briefly considering the possibility of differing levels of harm (v) where the agent with
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contributory negligence, it is at least possible for the optimum to obtain. By contrast,
comparative negligence will always lead to too much care in this range if too much
weight is expected to be placed on one actor, as that agent will take excessive care
to avoid any potential lawsuit which would disproportionately place damages on him
relative to the victim.24
Another way of stating this conclusion is that contributory negligence is socially
preferable to comparative negligence under bilateral harm when care exhibits strong
strategic complementarity. The reason is that the expected inefficiency due to socially
excessive care is greater under comparative negligence.
Intuitively, why should the strategic complementarity or substitutability of care
matter? Take the case of strong strategic substitutes. If both agents take care,
then, with care being a strategic substitute, one agent's decision to deviate would
not dramatically affect the risk. On the other hand, if both agents are not taking
care, and then one decides to take care, the effect on risk, and hence liability, is
dramatic. It follows that if the Hand Formula (which hypothesizes that the other
a smaller v believes that he is in a case of bilateral harm, while the actor with the larger v knows that
he is more at risk of harm than the other. In other words, information in this setting is asymmetric.
For example, one could consider a driver transporting a precious piece of art with near infinite value.
For him, care would be a dominant strategy under both contributory and comparative negligence as
long as his share of damages is strictly positive. However, since the other actor believes he is playing
a different game, he may decide to not take care as per section 3.1 even though care was optimal. In
this case, comparative negligence may have done better by ruling out no care as a possibility for the
potential tortfeasor. Note, however, that assuming that these cases are vanishingly rare (not many
people carry excessively valuable works of art on Sunday drives), we should not design a system
around avoiding these outlier cases relative to the more common settings of common knowledge.
Indeed, we would expect that drivers would recognize the − possibility of such an event and factor
that into the expected harm v as modeled above.
24The possibility has been raised that a court could consider using punitive damages as an alter-
nate means of reaching the social optimum. There are two major reasons we do not consider such
proposals here. First, historically, punitive damages have been used by courts in cases of intentional,
or very easily preventable, harm. The negligence cases under which the two regimes considered in
this case involve unintentional harm that requires a real cost to be prevented. In addition, it is
difficult to imagine using punitive damages in these cases since they involve inefficiently high levels
of care, instead of inefficiently low care. Indeed, to use such a policy here would involve the courts
penalizing an injurer for taking care in some circumstances.
57
agent takes care) binds, then the agent will surely deviate from the no care outcome
under contributory negligence. Conversely, if care is a strong strategic complement,
then one agent's deviation from the full care outcome dramatically affects risk. On
the other hand, if both agents are not taking care, one agent's decision to take care
does not affect risk greatly, and so he may not have an incentive to deviate from the
full no-care outcome.
We provided a numerical illustration of the strategic complementarity case in Part
2.1, discussing phone use while driving, where q = 0, p = 1
4
, and pi = 3
16
. Phone use
(especially sending text messages) while driving would appear to be a case that often
exhibits strategic complementarity, since care by only one party is likely to yield at
most a modest reduction in the likelihood of an accident relative to the full no-care
scenario. Recall that in that illustration both full care and full no-care are equilibria
under contributory negligence. However, under comparative negligence, with damages
split 75-25, the full care equilibrium is unique.
2.3.4 Care Under Unilateral Harm
Let us now consider the case of unilateral harm. This has been more central to
recent analysis of differing fault regimes, as it encompasses an even wider range of
negligence cases where the decision to take care by one individual/group has nothing
but an externality effect on the other party (i.e., there is no direct benefit to herself
of the individual taking care). In many ways, these are the cases that are of greater
interest to researchers, as they entail one party who would never take care in the
absence of an intervening court regime. In this case, party A has zero probability of
being harmed regardless of the care decision. This change is shown in Table 2.
Unilateral harm changes the relationship between contributory and comparative
negligence. Under bilateral harm, contributory negligence already had expected dam-
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Table 2: Unilateral Harm Care No Care
Care −x,−qv − x −x,−piv
No Care −piv,−x 0 (−spv),−pv (−(1− s)pv)
ages shared between the two parties if neither (or both) took care; therefore, compar-
ative negligence only has the potential to lead to asymmetries in expected damage
amounts paid between the two agents. By contrast, under unilateral harm, contrib-
utory negligence behaves as strict liability for the victim if neither takes care. This
means that one agent is already bearing the whole burden, while under comparative
negligence they are sharing the burden in some way. As expected, this change will
drive the differences between the regimes in these two cases.25
Proposition 4: Under unilateral harm, when care is not a strong strate-
gic complement there is no difference in equilibria between comparative and
contributory negligence.
The proof of proposition 4 is simply a corollary of proposition 1 and is left to the
reader.
This equivalence changes with strong strategic complements. In contrast to the
case with bilateral harm, unilateral harm makes it possible for comparative negligence
to actually generate multiple equilibria in comparison to a unique care outcome of
contributory negligence. In particular,










25A point that has been raised is that we could imagine courts abstracting away from the distinc-
tion between comparative and contributory negligence and instead simply think of choosing a split
in damages (s) in some form of optimal way. For example, our results here show that an s of close
to 12 is always optimal under the current application of the Hand Formula; later we will (implicitly)
show that an s of close to 1 or 0 is optimal under bilateral harm. Nothing prevents the reader from
interpreting our results in this way, but we maintain the language of contributory and comparative
negligence in order to both stay in line with the previous literature and make recommendations
which will be of clear uses to courts within the current climate.
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generates both no care and full care equilibria, while contributory negli-
gence generates only the full care equilibrium .
This comes directly from the discussion above. Contributory negligence only gen-
erates full care because the benefit of care is fully internalized into the single potential
victim, leading him to always be willing to take care even when the injurer does not.
Since the injurer knows that the victim will always take care, he needs to take care
in order to avoid being found negligent. By contrast, if courts have the two divide
fault evenly when neither takes care, there will no longer be an incentive to care on
the part of the victim if he expects the injurer to not take care. He knows that the
court will require the injurer to at least partially compensate the damages. Therefore,
unlike the above analysis, comparative negligence actually leads to weakly less care.
As above, however, this is a range in which it would be better to receive no care.









society prefers the no care equilibrium in the range described above.
Proposition 6: Under unilateral harm, contributory negligence gives
weakly too much care compared to comparative negligence.
Again, comparative negligence is socially preferable to contributory negligence
under unilateral harm when care exhibits strong strategic complementarity. The
expected inefficiency due to socially excessive care (overdeterrence) is greater under
contributory negligence.
It is important to note that, by one interpretation, this result is stronger than
proposition 3. Note that the preference for contributory negligence when both parties
can be harmed comes from the possibility that, under comparative negligence, one
party will believe that he will be found more at fault if both similarly behave without
care. However, while this is possible, as described in the simple example above, it
relies on a form of court preference for punishing one group over the other despite
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the fact that, based solely on the model, both were equally at fault in terms of harm
avoidance.
In contrast, this result relies on the fact that the two parties will be found by
the court to be relatively equally at fault. Therefore, when there is one victim and
one injurer, it is key to achieving the optimal equilibrium that the victim and injurer
will be found roughly equal in fault, which is consistent with the actual fault caused
within the model. Indeed, if agents always expect to split damages equally when they
are both found at fault under comparative negligence, then the two will be identical
with two victims and comparative negligence will be preferable with a single victim.
The difference in these results is driven by the fact that the two parties already
share risk equally under contributory negligence with bilateral harm; therefore, com-
parative negligence can only serve to make risk less equally shared and leads to an
over-internalizing of potential harm without taking into consideration the strategic
effects of added cost via incentivizing the other party to take care. By contrast, under
unilateral harm, the harms are already fully internalized by one party (the victim)
who will not take into consideration the potential costs to the injurer of care when
she decides to be careful herself, thereby setting up a potential negligence suit. In
this case, comparative negligence can serve to more properly divide the risk of harm
between the two agents, preventing either from taking too much care.
2.3.5 Differing Costs of Care
The same analysis can be extended to an asymmetry in costs instead of an asymmetry
in potential harm. In such a setting, just as with unilateral harm, one party who can
take care without much cost may do so under contributory negligence since he receives
the benefit of pushing all of the damages onto the other, potentially negligent actor if
they believe that the other will not take care. This would lead to potentially excessive
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Table 3: Asymmetric Costs of Care Care No Care
Care −qv − x1,−qv − x2 −x1,−2piv
No Care −2piv,−x2 −pv (−2spv),−pv (−2(1− s)pv)
care as the other agent now needs to take care to avoid being found negligent and
saddled with the joint damages. Although this seems to contradict the old intuition,
dating back to Calabresi (1970) that the cheaper cost avoider should take care, here
the equilibrium expectation of the cheaper avoider's taking care induces the other
agent to take care, leading to inefficiency. In this case, comparative negligence can
be used to preclude the inefficient outcome by having the agent who can take care
with lower cost pay less than his share of damages.
To see this, first note that, as with the standard case, there are no differences
unless care is a strong strategic complement and both parties would be found negligent
(i.e., max{x1,x2}
v
< 2(pi − q)). Therefore, we can focus solely on whether the no care
equilibrium exists under this appropriate set. Under contributory negligence, a no
care equilibrium will exist in this setting if and only if min{x1,x2}
v
> p. By contrast,
under comparative negligence a no care equilibrium will exist iff x1
v
> 2sp and x2
v
>




]; such an s exists
iff x1+x2
2v
> p. It's easy to see that this means that no care is supportable for a greater
range of x
v
than under contributory negligence, since only the average cost of care
needs to be greater than pv, not the minimum cost. Note that no care is optimal if
and only if x1+x2
v
> p − q; therefore, these potential added no care equilibria would
be socially optimal.
Proposition 7: Comparative negligence has stronger incentives for op-
timal care if the average cost of care exceeds the average expected harm
when no one takes care. Contributory negligence has stronger incentives
for optimal care otherwise.
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Table 4: Optimal Negligence Regimes Preferred Negligence Regime Optimal Risk Sharing
Unilateral Harm Comparative Negligence Equitable
Bilateral Harm
(w/ Symmetric Costs of Care)
Contributory Negligence Equitable
Bilateral Harm
(w/ Asymmetric Costs of Care)
Comparative Negligence More risk on high cost avoider
Note that this means that for comparative negligence to be socially optimal, it is




]. This means that the party that faces a higher
cost of care must face a higher share of damages. This helps to alleviate the incentive
for excessive care by allowing the two agents to share risk more efficiently. Under
contributory negligence, the actor with the lower cost still faces the same private
value of care and will therefore take care and create a potentially negligent situation
for the higher cost actor. By having that agent pay a smaller share of the total
damages, the two parties will now be taking similar decisions and are less likely
to distort the incentives of the other with their private actions. As with unilateral
harm, comparative negligence serves a role of aligning incentives between two ex ante
asymmetric agents.
Having concluded equilibrium analysis of different scenarios under both negligence
regimes, Table 4 provides the recommendations for which regime courts should prefer
within each. In Online Appendix A, we consider a potential modification to the way
that the courts apply the Hand Formula which could, in some circumstances, alleviate
the concerns raised here.
2.4 Discussion
As we noted, one of the features distinguishing this model from the earlier literature
is our use of the legal test for contributory negligence as stated by courts and actually
implemented in the cases. Much of the previous literature has instead assumed neg-
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ligence is determined by a finding of care below economically optimal levels, denoted
x* and y* (e.g., Landes and Posner (1987)). This approach, however, incorporates
several assumptions that may not always be accurate as descriptions of how courts
operate. For example, it assumes that courts, presented with ex-post evidence, will
have the same level of understanding of the ex-ante statistical regularities as the
potential injurers and victims, which may not be valid in all cases. This approach
also ignores the binding role of precedent on questions that reappear before courts.
Lastly, the previous approach is inappropriate for areas of the law such as professional
malpractice, where custom rules often bind courts.
Although our approach may seem peculiar at first glance, it is actually a relaxation
of the approach of the previous literature. Instead of assuming that courts (1) apply
the contributory negligence standard and (2) also filter out inefficient equilibria, our
model allows us to examine incentives when courts stop at the first step or fail to
carry out the second step competently. This additional flexibility generates defensive
care outcomes that do not appear in previous models. Indeed, this model provides
a positive theory of defensive medicine, a phenomenon that has been demonstrated
empirically (e.g., Kessler and McClellan (1996) and DeKay and Asch (1998)) but is
otherwise puzzling within the standard model of negligence.
Another feature distinguishing this model is our description of the technology of
joint care in terms of strategic complementarity or substitutability. Under strong
strategic complementarity, if no one is taking care, one person's decision to take care
does not have a dramatic impact on risk of accident; both sides need to take care
to substantially affect risk. Outside of the case of strong strategic complementarity,
contributory negligence and comparative negligence are indistinguishable in terms of
equilibrium care. Differences are observed when care is strongly strategically comple-
mentary.
64
In the bilateral harm case we've shown that comparative negligence can enhance
incentives to take care relative to contributory negligence, which is somewhat of a
surprise given that Brown (1973) had concluded that comparative negligence reduces
care incentives relative to contributory negligence, and the literature correcting Brown
suggested that the two regimes are equivalent in care incentives (with perfect infor-
mation courts). In this model, care incentives under bilateral harm are equivalent
except in the case of strong strategic complementarity. In that special case, compar-
ative negligence generates greater care incentives, when care costs are roughly the
same on both sides, as long as the share of fault is assigned sufficiently asymmetri-
cally. However, this additional care is inefficient. The upshot is in that in the absence
of some reason extrinsic to the model, contributory negligence is socially preferable
under bilateral harm with similar care costs - a situation exemplified by common
automobile accidents.
This raises the question whether there are conditions, extrinsic to this model, un-
der which the additional care under comparative negligence could be efficient in the
bilateral harm setting. Asymmetry in fault assignment in this model is consistent
with a jury basing its fault percentages on observable characteristics of the parties
or of the accident  e.g., active versus passive force, male versus female driver, teen
versus adult driver. If these status-based determinations correlate positively with the
greater-taxed party's irrational tendency not to take care, then comparative negli-
gence could be socially preferable to contributory negligence in the bilateral harm
setting, by introducing a form of efficient statistical discrimination into the fault
system. Assigning a greater share of fault to young male drivers might offset their
tendency to be overly confident in their driving skills.
With bilateral harm and asymmetric costs we find that the familiar Cheapest
Cost Avoider reasoning no longer provides a useful heuristic. Putting liability on
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the cheapest cost avoider generates strategic foisting and socially excessive care. This
indicates that the traditional result holds only in a scenario which assumes perfect
information by the court. Hence, legislatures and courts must consider strategic
considerations when determining how to assign liability, which thus far has been
absent from those considerations.
The unilateral harm case is illustrated by a doctor and a patient, where strong
strategic complementarity implies that both the doctor and patient must take care to
avoid a poor outcome; the doctor must prescribe the right dose and the patient must
take his medicine under the recommended conditions. Here contributory negligence
generates excessive care as the unique equilibrium, and comparative negligence moves
us toward optimality by making the no care outcome a potential equilibrium.
It may seem strange at first to suggest that the no care equilibrium might be
optimal in the medical care context, but we view defensive medicine as a perfect
illustration of such a scenario. Relative to the slight risk of harm, it may be inefficient
for both doctor and patient to take some types of precaution, but the liability system
may induce them to do so consistently under contributory negligence. Comparative
negligence can reduce this tendency toward excessive precaution.
2.5 Conclusion
We have shown that, under an application of the Hand Formula that maps more
closely to the stated behavior of real-world courts, there may be differences between
contributory and comparative negligence regimes which have not previously been
noted in the literature. In particular one regime is likely to yield inefficiently too
much care - a situation we have described as defensive care. When the setting is sym-
metric (i.e., bilateral harm with identical costs of taking care), contributory negligence
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provides weakly better incentives by avoiding this excessive care, while asymmetric
settings such as unilateral harm and non-identical costs of care lead to comparative
negligence potentially yielding superior results by allowing for proper risk sharing.
Therefore, given the information and doctrinal constraints binding courts when
determining standards of care, our approach provides simple recommendations for
how courts should be asked to determine negligence. Comparative negligence always
provides the optimal level of care if risk is shared equally between the two agents.
This requires that the two actors pay equal damages in cases of dual negligence when
their costs of care were approximately equal, and the potential injurer with the higher
cost of care bears a larger share when there is an asymmetry. If the courts cannot
commit to such a regime (for example, when juries are instructed to set damage
levels in cases of dual negligence), then courts should allow contributory negligence
defenses to cases where both parties are potential victims (bilateral harm), and limit
comparative negligence to the more common cases of comparative negligence.
Although this paper breaks from earlier models, we see it as consistent with a gen-
eral progression in economics away from the assumption that players are all-knowing,
in the sense of perfectly understanding statistical regularities among relevant eco-
nomic variables, and instead allowing for the possibility that institutions may not
perform optimally according to our models. While it may be obvious that inefficient
equilibria arise when courts are not likely to implement or perfectly capable of imple-
menting a full-information optimality rule, the interesting question is precisely how
the results play out under plausible deviations from the perfect information ideal.
The case of the all-knowing and efficiency-seeking court is actually a special case of
this model, where inefficient equilibria are excluded.
In general, it would not be difficult to extend this analysis to other settings where
courts consider what the ex ante optimal negligence mechanism is for securing optimal
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care. This paper implies that such a mechanism should keep relative incentives based
on private cost to private value as symmetric as possible. This will be achieved by
equal risk sharing when the care game is already ex ante symmetric, while setting an
optimal share of damages otherwise. For example, if one agent faces a lower private
cost, he should also perceive relatively less benefit from taking care. Future research
into optimal court regimes should focus on keeping strategic incentives symmetric.
In addition, this analysis could also be applied to other potential asymmetries
besides cost and damages. For example, it is reasonable to think that the care of
some agents would lead to a greater reduction in the probability of harm than the
care of others - indeed, much of the cheapest cost avoider intuition in accident
law economics is based on such reasoning. Our work thus far seems to imply that
these agents should potentially pay a different share of damages under comparative
negligence than the other party. The framework we have used would be quite useful
for examining asymmetries such as this, which may uncover more differences between
contributory and comparative negligence regimes.
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3 Multidimensional Strategic Communication with
Uncertain Salience
3.1 Introduction
Economists and political scientists have long recognized that experts, including those
at biased interest groups, may possess more information about optimal policy-making
than those actually implementing the policy. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that
those who have the most at stake, and therefore might have the most conflict of
interest with society writ large, would also be those with the best information. Since
at least Crawford and Sobel (1982), we have recognized that biased experts can never
perfectly transmit the information they possess since talk is cheap.
Interest groups and experts attempting to influence policy do not simply hold
more information about the true state of the world, but they may also hold more
information about their own conflicts of interest. For example, Li and Madarasz
(2008) demonstrated that in a simple, unidimensional case, experts with sufficiently
large biases always benefit when bias is ex-ante uncertain, and that even the policy-
makers themselves may benefit.
The limit for much of the previous literature on receiver uncertainty over senders'
preferences is that it often relies on uncertainty only over the degree or direction of
the conflict of interest on any given dimension(s), which is often revealed clearly over
time. In reality, however, much of the uncertainty surrounding experts coming from
interest groups is not over whether they are left-wing or right-wing, or the extent
of how biased they are, but instead comes from how they order their priorities over
different topics. Indeed, by potentially possessing information over topics which are
not salient to the expert, the expert has additional degrees of freedom to manipulate
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the receiver. This provides an incentive for biased groups to invest in and then
transmit information about topics over which they have no stake.
For example, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) presents model
legislation to state legislatures. They write such hypothetical legislation by employing
known policy experts on taxation, regulation, criminal justice, etc. They are generally
known as being a right-wing organization, though not all legislation they support is
uniformly conservative, such as their known support for ending mandatory minimum
sentencing.
According to a 2011 investigative report in the New York Times, 99% of ALEC's
funding comes from industry and trade groups (Peterka (2011)). This raises the
question of why they spend significant portions of their funding on topics not related
to the interest of their donors. In particular, why do they support some policies
that seem to run directly counter to standard pro-business right-wing interests (e.g.,
support for E-Verify)?
I show that this effect can be explained by receiver uncertainty over the salience
of each issue to the expert. If the type is sufficiently biased on his dimension of
interest, he will choose to make comparative statements across dimensions (in the vein
of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007)). However, unlike in that work, the expert's
statement will not actually be driven by comparative results on both dimensions,
but by a preference over their salient dimension. While the rational policy-maker
will correct for this, this will still allow the expert to send a more balanced set of
information, and therefore achieve more manipulation of the receiver than if he was
sending along just the one dimension. Therefore, groups such as ALEC may discuss
issues which are not important to their donors because doing so obfuscates what is
important to them and makes it more difficult for the policy-maker to correct for
their bias.
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As in Li and Madarasz (2008), there will be situations in which this will actually be
of benefit to both parties. This is because the use of multiple dimensions garbles the
message, adding noise which coarsens any message's precision (and hence the level
of manipulation). However, such benefit will only hold if the expert is sufficiently
biased such that virtually no information would be sent on just one dimension. If
even a relatively small amount of information could be signaled on one dimension, the
receiver would actually prefer a type-independent equilibrium in which all types act
as if all issues were salient to them, removing the manipulation above. This, however,
may not be preferred by the expert, who for a non-trivial range of biases will still have
an incentive to manipulate across dimensions even when type-independent outcomes
would be more beneficial to society. Therefore, while unbiased senders will only send
on their salient dimensions, and very biased senders (such as ALEC) may actually
be better for the receiver when they are feigning general-interest politics, there will
exist mildly biased groups where society would prefer they revealed their type, but
will choose instead to use multiple dimensions to manipulate the receiver.
In this setting, I will show that a policy of requiring disclosure would be unnec-
essarily coarse, even if it was possible. Since there are areas where coarser signals
with cross-dimensional manipulation are beneficial, disclosure would actually make
the policy-maker worse off in some settings. Instead, I propose a novel, simple linear
tax on lobbying along multiple dimensions. Such a tax can be designed to remove
the cross-dimensional externality created by those types that only care about one
dimension while maintaining the incentive to do so when it is beneficial for society
writ-large.
I build upon the literature involving strategic communication along multiple di-
mensions (e.g., Krishna and Morgan (2001b,a); Battaglini (2002); Chakraborty and
Harbaugh (2007, 2010)). This past literature has primarily shown how adding addi-
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tional dimensions can allow for information transmission that would not have been
possible along a single dimension. These models do so by allowing the receiver to use
the degree of freedom provided by an extra dimension to leverage additional informa-
tion. With uncertain salience, however, many of these positive results are reversed,
as it is now the sender who can use the additional dimension to leverage more ma-
nipulation of the receiver. In this way, the model of strategic communication with
uncertain salience builds upon concepts raised by Levy and Razin (2007), who showed
that there can be limits to communication across dimensions when there is correla-
tion between those dimensions. In this model, the correlation between dimensions is
endogenously created by the senders who do not actually care about both dimensions.
In addition, this builds upon the policy relevant question of whether and when
disclosure is beneficial. Li and Madarasz (2008) made the argument that disclosure
will often be harmful, as uncertainty can actually allow greater information transmis-
sion in equilibrium. This analysis qualifies that result; unlike uncertainty over bias,
uncertainty over salience can actually cause losses via the false information being
sent along some dimensions, even while it is facilitating greater information transmis-
sion along the other dimensions. This trade-off means that there may be a role for
disclosure. However, in these settings, there is a simpler classic policy intervention
available, a linear Pigouvian tax on externalities, that can potentially improve upon
the results of disclosure.
3.2 Model
There exists a true state of the world, θ ∈ [0, 1]N , with N ≥ 2. Each dimension's
state θk, with k ∈ {1, ..., N}, is drawn i.i.d. from a differentiable distribution F with
pdf f , such that the mean value of each dimension is µ. Each dimension may be
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thought of as a particular policy issue of potential significance to the involved agents.




xk), where x ∈ [0, 1]N is a policy vector which will be chosen by P. Her utility is
single-peaked and maximized when xk = θk ∀k.
She will choose her policy x after receiving a message m ∈ M from an expert,
henceforth identified as E. E also seeks to maximize his utility according to u(θdt +
b − xdt), where b ≥ 0 is a bias term representing conflict of interest between E and
P, and dt is the dimension which the expert cares about. Hence, he differs from the
policy-maker in two ways: he may prefer a more right-wing policy than the policy-
maker on any given dimension, and he may not care about some dimensions which the
policy-maker does. For any given type, we will refer to dt as his salient dimension.
Let t ∈ T index the type of the expert, as represented by his salient dimension





Note that herein lies the distinction between the model and previous work on
strategic communication under uncertainty. In standard models of strategic commu-
nication with uncertainty, the uncertainty lies over the direction and/or magnitude
of the bias. In many real world cases, however, we expect to have a reasonably
strong prior on the bias of senders: for example, the Cato Institute prefers libertarian
policies while the Center for American Progress prefers liberal policies. However, it
is reasonable for those attempting to interpret the information coming from groups
of experts to be uncertain of the degree to which the principals of these groups care
about and rank the different topics on which they report. Indeed, those funding these
groups may only step in and enforce bias on a certain set of topics. Therefore, this
model captures this set of incentives in the form of uncertain salience.
We will focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game and define an equilibrium
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of the messaging game in the following way:
Definition 1: An equilibrium consists of:
1. A partition Π of the message space M,






3. Beliefs E[•|m] formed via Bayes' Rule, and
4. A set of mappings {mt}t∈T , such that mt : θ → m, m ∈M∗, and
mt ∈ argmax
m
u(|θdt + b− xt|) ∀t.
As is typical in games of strategic communication, there will exist multiple equi-
libria for any particular set of primitives. Therefore, we will restrict attention further
to a special set set of equilibria:
Definition 2: Let Ω be the collection of equilibria for any game defined by
{N,F, u, T}. A sender-preferred equilibrium is an equilibrium ω such that
ω ∈ argmax
ω′∈Ω
E[u(|θdt + b− xdt |)]
The concept of simplifying to sender-preferred equilibria deals with the problem
of equilibrium multiplicity in a way that remains faithful to the motivation of such
strategic communication models. Focusing on an equilibrium which the sender prefers
is both consistent with previous literature on multi-dimensional strategic communi-
cation (e.g., Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007)) and represents the fact that it is the
sender who moves first; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the sender has more
control over the set of messages that can be sent.
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3.3 Equilibrium Information Transmission
The equilibrium message of the expert will be entirely determined by what they wish
to happen on the sole salient dimension to the policy-maker:
Observation 1: Consider an equilibrium with message partition Π with k ele-
ments. Order the partition such that xdtm1 ≥ xdtm2 ≥ ... ≥ xdtmk .















Therefore, for a given type t, the receiver will only be receiving information on dt.
The problem, of course, is that the policy-maker may be unaware which dimension
about which she is receiving accurate information.
One potential way around this problem for the policy-maker would be to have
each type of sender behave identically by sending messages with an effective bias of
b on each dimension. In such a hypothetical equilibrium, since each type behaves the
same, there will be no updating about types based upon messages (since each type
sends each message with the same probability) and therefore no incentive to lie on
the dimensions the expert does not care about.
Formally:
Definition 3: Let a type-independent equilibrium be such that
1. Each type t has the same mapping mt, and
2. The states of the world that induce x are bordered and connected by lines parallel
to a dimension d.
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Figure 8:
Such type-independent equilibria are equivalent to an expert sending a Crawford-
Sobel message on each dimension. Therefore, it effectively neutralizes the relevant
uncertainty over salience. Each types sends the same messages over the same states,
as seen in Figure 1.
Even when b is constant across dimensions, however, this may be unattainable if we
are within the realm of sender-preferred equilibria. If the sender's bias is sufficiently
high, he will prefer an equilibrium which differentiates behavior across types, as the
obfuscation will allow for more manipulation of the policy-maker. Specifically, let
pˆmit be the updated probability of type t given message mi. Then the following also
follows directly:
Observation 2: In a non-type independent equilibrium, xdtmi = pˆ
mi
t E[θdt |mi] +
(1− pˆmit )µ.
Due to the probability that the sender is effectively babbling along the dimension,
the action becomes an attenuated version of the signal as it would be interpreted if the
policy-maker knew it was being sent by the biased sender. Such bundling of correct
and incorrect information has two primary effects on the ability for useful information
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Figure 9:
transmission. First, it allows information to be sent even with larger biases, due to the
gravity towards the mean on all dimensions, and also will allow for a finer partition
of the action space on each dimension than if their was no uncertainty:
Lemma 1: Non-type independent equilibria exist for larger values of b than type-
independent equilibria and are more balanced.
This result is a similar incentive to the one found in the unidimensional case of Li
and Madarasz (2008), as well as the beneficial role of small amounts of noise found in
Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007). This can be seen in Figure 2. The presence of
rote uncertainty allows the policy-maker to still make inference from a signal even if
the expected (or in this case, known) bias is large. This effect will also lead to greater
balancedness, as the attenuation of actions towards the mean leads the relevant type
of expert to a more evenly partitioned state space. Recall that in the unidimensional
model as used by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Li and Madarasz (2008), because
the expected bias is right-wing, the left-most signal will be very precise, with each
right-more signal being less precise. Relative to the unidimensional case (with known
or unknown biases), uncertain salience flattens the gradient between the signals.
77
However, there are countervailing effects being driven by this attenuation; for any
partition of the state space, the ability to take an action away from the mean is
now constrained by the real probability that the sender is just babbling. Therefore,
for any given set of M equilibrium actions on a dimension, ordered by their actions
on a dimension from the left-most to the right-most, the left most action in the
unidimensional case will be more precise than the left-most action with uncertain
salience, and so on for each additional action:
Lemma 2: Consider an equilibrium with M actions in the unidimensional case
on dimension d, and the most informative equilibrium with M actions and uncertain
salience. Order the partition such that xdm1 ≥ xdm2 ≥ ... ≥ xdmk . For each i, message
mi with uncertain salience is less precise than message mi in the unidimensional case.
In addition, for the policy-maker there is another cost to the balance brought by
uncertainty over salience. She will always be receiving false information on one
dimension; she just does not know which dimension that is. While she accounts for
this when picking her actions, given a message space, this, in combination with the
loss of precision, will always limit the realized gains from greater balance for the
policy-maker.
Indeed, for the policy-maker, the effect of Lemma 2 combined with the manipula-
tion loss dominates the effect of Lemma 1 such that type-independent equilibria will
be preferred by the receiver unless the bias is so large that virtually no information
will be sent in the unidimensional case:
Proposition 1: There exists a b˜ > 0 such that if b < b˜, the receiver's preferred
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equilibrium is type-independent.
If we are in the realm of sender-preferred equilibria, however, it is more important
to consider the preferences of the expert. Whereas the effects described in Lemma 1
are similar for both parties (as it is simply a statement of discontinuity of equilibria),
Lemma 2 is more of a problem for the policy-maker. This is because it is the sender
who effectively chooses which action will be taken. Therefore, while the policy-maker
has to attenuate his actions towards the mean in order to avoid cross-dimensional
manipulation (which may or may not be coming), the expert can choose whichever
action he prefers. Therefore, the utility loss relative to the unidimensional case from
Lemma 2 is reduced for the expert, relative to the policy-maker
The following follows formally:
Theorem 1: There exists a b, bˆ such that b > bˆ > 0 and:
1. If b ≥ b, there does not exist an informative equilibrium,
2. If b ≤ bˆ, the sender-preferred equilibrium is type-independent involving MNCS
messages, where N is the number of types and MCS is the number of messages
in the maximally-informative unidimensional equilibrium, and
3. If b ≥ b ≥ bˆ, the sender-preferred equilibrium is non-type independent.
Moreover, bˆ < b˜.
If the bias is sufficiently small, the expert loses more in precision than he gains
from being able to disguise his type using other dimensions. Therefore, he will be
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willing to go along with the policy-maker and simply send direct signals along each
dimension.
To see the intuition, consider the limiting case as b → 0. The sender is already
going to be able to get the receiver to do what he wants on his preferred dimension;
by contrast, if he attempted to manipulate the policy-maker using other dimensions,
she would have to coarsen her response to each signal, since she doesn't know which
dimension the sender is actually basing his message upon. Therefore, while there may
be more actions numerically, they will all be closer to 1
2
than the relevant messages
given the type-independent case. Therefore, to abuse language, the sender is fine
revealing his type and sending a set of simple, unidimensional signals.
If the bias is larger, however, the manipulation gain for the sender will be suf-
ficiently enhanced. With a relatively large bias, the signals were always going to be
coarse, with actions that are not sufficiently differentiated, so the loss on that dimen-
sion due to attenuation is minimal. Instead, the manipulation gets the policy-maker
to provide the sender with a more balanced set of potential actions from which to
choose.
For example, consider the case of two dimensions distributed via U [0, 1], with
quadratic utility functions and an expert of b = .2 (this is what is displayed in Figures
1 and 2). In this case, the only informative unidimensional equilibrium (and therefore,
also the sender-preferred type-independent equilibrium) involves partitioning the state
space into [0, .1] and [.1, 1] on each dimension. In this scenario, the expert, who only
cares about one dimension, would take a utility loss of −.1, while the policy-maker,
who cares about both dimensions, would take a utility loss of −.12.
By contrast, the sender-preferred non-type independent equilibrium involves a
comparative statement (in the vein of Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007)) such that
the expert declares one dimension the high dimension, with corresponding action
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.605, and the other dimension the low dimension, with corresponding action .395.
This will lead to a utility loss for the expert of −.07, with a loss for the policy-maker
of −.14 (−.05 on the dimension with some revelation, with −.09 on the dimension
being manipulated). Therefore, the (mild) gain to the receiver on the dimension with
information revelation of greater balance in signals is outweighed by the loss from
receiving a false signal on the dimension on which they are being manipulated.
However, the expert will still prefer this equilibrium as they do not suffer any loss
from manipulation, and therefore their ability to create a more balanced message
space comes at the cost of an externality on the policy-maker.
As expected from the discussion surrounding Proposition 1, there will exist non-
trivial ranges of b such that there is an even further conflict of interest between the
expert and the policy-maker. In addition to the (known) conflict over preferences,
there is now also a conflict over whether the sender provides actual information over
both dimensions or simply uses his message concerning the other dimension in pur-
suit of a better outcome on his salient topic. Since there is no way for the receiver to
identify which type he is, the sender will be able to achieve greater levels of manipu-
lation even when the added balance is of no help to the policy-maker (and, implicitly,
society).
Note that in the case of symmetric distributions, such as the uniform above, the
sender-preferred non-type independent equilibrium will involve comparative state-
ments. As noted in Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007), these types of comparative
statements make communication possible even with highly biased agents. The model
with uncertain salience shows that this is true even if the sender only cares about one
dimension, and not all dimensions. Note here, however, that the comparative state-
ments may not actually be preferable to the sender relative to getting a coarser form
of information on just one dimension. Therefore who benefits from the additional
81
information transmission is not ex-ante obvious, but depends upon the particular
distribution involved and the size of bias.
The size of the wedge between the incentives of the expert and the policy-maker
to send comparative statements vs. type-independent statements is growing in the
number of dimensions involved:
Proposition 2: b˜− bˆ is increasing in N .
Note that the wedge is effectively an externality created by the expert sending false
information on the dimensions he does not find salient. This externality is increasing
in the number of dimensions as the sender gains a larger amount of false information
relative to the facts he is acquiring on the shared dimension of interest.
3.4 Endogenous Information Acquisition
Consider an extension of the model described above. Let there be a first-stage before
strategic communication occurs during which the expert can choose whether to invest
in a single topic or the full bundle of topics. This can be thought of as hiring accredited
experts in various fields, as well as publicizing their work in those areas. Therefore,
this decision about whether to be general-interest or special-interest will be observable
to the policy-maker.
Let us normalize the cost of investing in a single-topic to 0, and then let the cost
of investing in the full bundle be vanishingly small, but positive. The flavor of the
following results still go through with more significant investment costs, but this will
allow focus to remain upon the incentives of interest.
The following is immediate:
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Proposition 3: If b ∈ [bˆ, b], then the expert will choose to be general-interest.
Otherwise, he will specialize.
There is no difference (from the perspective of the expert) between the type-
independent outcome in multiple dimensions and the unidimensional outcome. There-
fore, their decision whether to pay the small cost of acquiring experts on other di-
mensions simply comes down to whether those other dimensions are helpful for them.
As discussed above, this is simply a question of whether the bias is small enough such
that the gain in ability to manipulate conditional on a signal is outweighed by the
loss in precision of each signal. Therefore, those with sufficiently small biases will
prefer to just commit to their sole topic.
As would also be expected from the preceding section, the range of biases where
the policy-maker would prefer to be manipulated is smaller than that for the receiver.
In particular:
Proposition 4: The lower-bound of ˜˜b such that the receiver would prefer the
sender be general interest is larger than bˆ.
As mentioned above, this is because the added informativeness of the signal on
one dimension (a benefit which accrues to both parties) creates an externality for the
policy-maker in the form of false information on the dimension which the sender
does not care about. Hence, there will be a range of moderately-small b such that
in a laissez-faire setting the lobbying expert will be a general-interest group, which
makes the receiver worse off than if she was just receiving information on a single
dimension.
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It should be noted that this ˜˜b for the receiver is lower than his b˜ from Proposition
1. This is because, if the sender specializes, the receiver will only get information
on the one dimension, and will have to play µ on every other dimension, while in a
type-independent equilibrium there will be some information on all dimensions. The
presence of endogenous information acquisition rules out informativeness on those
other dimensions.
The natural policy response, if possible, to the use of one dimension to falsely
manipulate across the other dimension would be to force disclosure of the expert's
incentives. This is consistent with the concept of requiring disclosure of donors for
interest groups. Unfortunately, in settings of uncertain salience, which seem to best
model the concepts underlying donor disclosure, such a response would be unneces-
sarily coarse. With donor disclosure, there would be no incentive for the expert to
acquire information about any area which is no salient to them. However, there are
types who are sufficiently biased such that they would basically be unable to send
information across one dimension without the rational coarseness added by the addi-
tional dimensions. Therefore, forcing donor disclosure would lead to inefficiently low
information acquisition.
An interesting note about this, however, is that this does not rely on the idea that
that information is actually being used directly. Instead, it is the known presence of
this information that creates uncertainty, and the uncertainty which adds necessary
balance to the message on the dimension along which information will actually be
sent.
There is, however, another policy response which can allow the policy-maker to
achieve the second best:
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Theorem 2: There exists a tax rate τ on general interest experts such that the
expert will only be general-interest when it is efficient.
A policy-maker can observe whether an expert is attempting to claim information
about only one dimension, or about multiple dimensions. Therefore, she can set a
linear tax on general-interest experts in such a way that types with b ∈ (bˆ, ˜˜b) will no
longer wish to acquire information along dimensions which they do not care about.
This is a simple Pigouvian tax on the externality created by false information along
non-salient dimensions, while retaining the ability of very-biased types to acquire that
information and benefit both themselves and the policy-maker.
As would be expected from Proposition 2, this tax will need to be larger the more
dimensions there are, as the externality becomes larger.
Proposition 5: τ is increasing in the number of dimensions N .
3.5 Conclusion
When conducting analysis of strategic communication under uncertainty, it must be
carefully considered what the relevant uncertainty is. If the uncertainty lies over the
salience of different issues to the expert, it may actually lead to more manipulation of
the receiver, as the expert sends false information along his indifferent dimensions in
order to get his way. Therefore, the policy-maker faces a conflict between incentivizing
information acquisition and creating an environment in which even biased types can
be useful to society, while not taking too significant of a loss on dimensions which are
being used as instruments by the sender.
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The policy implications of this framework can be tested in empirical settings. In
particular, it should be explored whether policy-making efficiency improves when it
is more costly for biased lobbyists to lobby on multiple dimensions, which would not
be true if such lobbying was simply driven by increasing returns to scale. In addition,
it remains to be tested whether moderately-more biased groups actually do indeed
become general-interest lobbyists more often. Indeed, the model implies that, while
an extremely biased group such as the NRA has an Institute for Legislative Action, it
is likely that this group serves a purpose other than actually making model legislation
recommendations; otherwise, they would have an incentive to cover a wider range of
topics. Therefore, it would be useful to test whether such lobbying as any actual
effect on outcomes.
Finally, the model proposes a new framework for thinking about regulating biased
experts. Rather than simply having types disclose their donors, it may be more
useful to legislatures and voters to have types keep that information private, but force
them to pay greater and greater penalties for how much information they purport to
send. Doing this may allow preservation of the beneficial information acquisition
role of privacy and the potential ability to send more information along coarsened
dimensions, but will also disincentivize unbeneficial manipulation. This framework
could potentially be extended to other models of strategic communication as well.
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Adam Smith Fellowship ($10,000), Mercatus Center, 2014 – 2016 
Rosenstein-Rodan Prize ($1,500), Best Original Research on Development Economics by 
a Graduate Student, Institute for Economic Development, Boston University, 2015 
Summer Research Grant ($10,000), Boston University Department of Economics, 2013, 2015 
Funding for MA Research Assistant ($4,800), Boston University Department of Economics, 
2015   
Humane Studies Fellowship ($7,000), Institute for Humane Studies, 2014 – 2015 
Public Choice Student Fellow ($995), Public Choice Society, 2015 – 2016 
Hayek Fund for Scholars ($1,100), Institute for Humane Studies, 2014 – 2015 
Charles Huse Prize for Best Second Year Paper, Boston University Department of Economics, 
2013 
 F. Harold Dubord Award ($1,000), Department of Government, Colby College, 2011 
 Laurie Peterson Memorial Award ($1,000), Department of Government, Colby College, 2010 
 Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society, 2010 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE  
 Teaching Assistant, Game Theory and Political Theory, Graduate: Department of Political 
Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 2015 
Lecturer, Economics of Less-Developed Nations, Undergraduate: Department of Economics,  
Boston University, Summer 2014  
Teaching Fellow, Principles of Microeconomics, Undergraduate: Department of Economics,  
Boston University, Fall 2012 - Fall 2013 
 Teaching Assistant, Game Theory, Undergraduate: Department of Economics, Colby College,  
Professor Jason Long, Spring 2011 
RESEARCH WORK EXPERIENCE  
Research Assistant, Boston University School of Law, Professor Keith N. Hylton, Summer 
2014 
Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Boston University, Professor Robert G. King,  
  Summer 2012 
 Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Colby College, Professor Samara Gunter,   
  Summer 2010 
 Research Intern, Bureau of Labor Standards, Maine Department of Labor, Summer 2009 
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICE  
Referee, American Law and Economics Review  
Organizer, Boston University Political Economy Reading Group, 2013 – Present  
